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Reliance upon computers in modem society has caused a
greater awareness of the problems that can result from unauthor-
ized computer access3 and abuse. Despite this awareness, however,
no standards presently exist which specify the precise degree of
computer security4 required to prevent liability. The result is that
2. "The central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increases the
potential for abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to say that future
developments will not demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such technology." Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607, 97 S. CL 869, 880 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring).
3. "Access" in the broadest sense refers to one's ability to use a computer system. In a
narrower sense, however, it refers to one's ability to affect a particular data item on a comput-
erized file. The term, as used in this article, means the ability to read, modify, or destroy a
specific data item. Therefore, unauthorized access, with respect to a specific data item on a
computerized file means the fact of reading, modifying, or destroying that data item in an
impermissible manner.
4. The standard definition of "data security" is the "protection of data against acci-
dental or intentional disclosure to unauthorized persons, or unauthorized modifications or
destruction." J. MARTIN, SECuirY, ACCURACY, AND PRIVACY IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS 5
(1973) [hereinafter Martin]. See also R. FISHER, INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY 20
(1984) [hereinafter Fisher]. "Computer security" is "the technological safeguards and mana-
gerial procedures which can be applied to computer .. .data to assure that organizational
assets and individual privacy are protected." L. HOFFMAN, MODERN METHODS FOR COM-
PUTER SECURITY AND PRIVACY (1977) [hereinafter Hoffman].
Violations of computer security are often termed "computer abuse." It is important to
understand that there are many types of computer abuse other than unauthorized access. For
example, the most perfect protection against unauthorized access will not stop authorized
individuals from acts such as fraudulently altering records, selling proprietary data to com-
petitors, using the company's computers to run their own business, or taking illegal advan-
tage of confidential computerized information. See generally, A. BEQUAI, How TO PREVENT
COMPUTER CRIME 17-21 (1983) [hereinafter Bequai].
Further, computer negligence can involve many things other than security. We shall not
deal with product liability for software, (See, eg., Gemignani, Product Liability and Software,
8 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 173 (1981); Conley, Tort Theories of Recovery Against
Vendors of Defective Software, 13 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (1987); Reece, Defec-
tive Expert Systems Raise Personal Injury Liability Issues, NAT'L. L.J., Oct. 12, 1987, at 24-29
(inevitable that courts will have to address theories of liability as persons are injured as a
result of defective systems)) or with breach of warranty (See, e.g., Comment, The Warranty of
Merchantability and Computer Software Contracts: A Square Peg Won't Fit in a Round Hole,
59 WASH. L. REV. 511 (1984) (authored by Edward Durney); RAYSMAN & BROWN infra
note 22, 9. 3.04 (1987); Friedman & Hildebrand, Computer Litigation: A Buyer's Theories of
Liability, THE COMPUTER LAW., Dec. 1987, at 34 (avoiding pro-vendor provisions of the
standard hardware/software contract)). These important computer-related actions are be-
yond the scope of this paper and are not concerned with unauthorized access except in the
most incidental manner.
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victims of computer abuse are unlikely to be compensated for their
misfortunes, since there is no reference point against which to mea-
sure negligence or failure to perform at accepted professional skill
levels. This is an anomalous situation since general principles of
computer security have been known to practitioners for over a
decade.
This article seeks to explain (1) the need for establishing stan-
dards for protecting computerized data, (2) the computer industry's
reluctance to create industry-wide security measures, and (3) law-
yers' concerns in establishing standards for a still evolving industry.
Section II explains in simplified terms the need for protection and
highlights this need with several examples of the harm that can re-
sult from the lack of computer security. Section III attempts to fa-
miliarize the reader with general computer system fundamentals
and explains the problems that routinely occur in implementing
computer security. Section IV compares several views concerning
the need for computer security standards and addresses the practi-
cal limitations in allowing the private sector to set security stan-
dards. Finally, this article concludes that federal regulations are
needed to establish meaningful standards for implementing com-
puter security measures and protecting against computer abuse.
II. UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO DATA: HARM, LIABILITY, AND
STANDARDS OF DUE CARE
A. Printed Data
Unauthorized access to confidential information held by a pri-
vate or public enterprise can cause a staggering amount of harm.
Consider three examples. A law firm in the middle of a major case
has its work product stolen, and the fie falls into the hands of op-
posing counsel. A client's case may be badly compromised because
personal weaknesses are revealed and an attorney's strategy is ex-
posed.' Second, radiation treatment information on cancer patients
is destroyed in a fit of malicious mischief. The delay in recreating
the data may cause extreme discomfort for, and threaten the lives
of, several seriously ill patients.6 Third, a service bureau is process-
ing tax information from a medium-sized firm to be sent to the In-
ternal Revenue Service. Records are stolen from the bureau's files,
5. Suggested by an example in R. Levary and K. Duke, Some Aspects of Potential
Disclosure of Confidential Computerized Legal Materials, 4 COMPUTER LJ. 159, 160 (1983).
6. Suggested by possibilities in P. Elmer-DeWitt, The 414 Gang Strikes Again. TIMp.
Aug. 29, 1983, at 75 (famous case of "hackers" intruding on hospital computer system via
telephone lines in a manner reminiscent of the movie War Games).
266 Vol. 5
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and the salary of a key employee is made known'to a business rival.7
Substantial embarrassment to the firm may result, and that key em-
ployee may be lured to the competitor by the offer of a higher salary
or other benefits.
Public or private enterprises have always routinely taken steps
to protect their important documents against unauthorized access.
Customers and clients assume that reasonable steps will be taken to
keep confidential information secure. Whether that same assump-
tion can be made with regard to computerized data is unclear.
B. Computerized Data
In the past, confidential information was physically stored on
paper kept in ordinary office files. A thief had to physically break
into the files in order to gain access. Thus, enterprises were careful
to invoke strong security measures to protect against such a break-
in. Today, such security measures are no longer adequate. One can
access confidential information in computer files without physically
obtaining the data. This kind of "theft" is potentially more damag-
ing than the physical removal of information, since computerized
data can be compromised without the fact of "theft" having ever
been detected.
Thus, just as customers and clients assume that a business will
protect its physical files from being burglarized, they should also be
able to assume that adequate computer security measures will be
implemented to prevent unauthorized access to their computer
files.8
7. Suggested by IRS Requires Filing Tax Return Information on Magnetic Media,
Computer Law and Tax Report, September 1986, at 6.
8. A recent work clearly expresses the present dilemma
Historically, privacy protection was augmented by cumbersome data collection
and processing techniques that in themselves safeguarded individual inter-
ests. . . .As long as data about medical records, credit payments, mar-
riages. . .were kept in hard copy file cabinets in unrelated business and
governmental offices, there was little chance that they could be integrated into
a large information pool about the individual. Even if that had been possible,
hand processing and analysis would have been prohibitive .... Today, exposure
to uncontrolled disclosure has greatly increased. The systems that store perti-
nent information about individuals are accessible through small machines lo-
cated in homes and operated by novices through personal telephones .... The
personal computer, in connection with large computer systems accessible by
telephone, has introduced the threat of individual voyeurism to an extent
unimaginable in prior years.
R. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, 12.02 (1985).
1989]
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C. Liability for Third-Party Actions
Suppose a person is injured by unauthorized access to personal.
data. To what extent is the enterprise holding the data liable for
failing to secure that information. This question becomes even
more important to the victim when an unauthorized accessor can-
not be identified and the victim's only source of recovery is the en-
terprise itself.
There are several possible theories under which a victim may
proceed. Generally, however, recovery is unlikely. Even if an enter-
prise owes a duty of care to another9 , it will not be liable for the
tortious acts of third parties unless those acts were "reasonably
foreseeable."1 In the past, this phrase has been narrowly con-
strued"1 , making it difficult for a victim to recover his loss.
Breach of contract is another alternative. An enterprise is held
to the degree of skill possessed by ordinary members of that trade or
business. If it fails to meet this level of care, it may be liable in
contract.1 2 However, courts rarely extend protection for conduct
not recognized within the professional community or expressly cov-
ered by the terms of the agreement; thus, unless an individual in-
cludes an express level of care in the contract, recovery is tenuous.
Regardless of whether liability is founded in tort or contract,
9. See generally 57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 33 (1971).
10. The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a
superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although an actor's
negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the
third person to commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his
negligent conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a
situation might be created, and that a third person might avail himself of the
opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965). See generally 57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence
§§ 206-207 (1971).
11. See Hilligoss v. Cross Cos., 304 Minn. 546, 228 N.W.2d 585 (1975) (landlord could
not reasonably have foreseen that unknown thief would steal from tenant, even though land-
lord posted signs advertising that new apartment keys could be picked up at the building
office); Irby v. St. Louis County Cab Co., 560 SW 2d 392, 396 (Mo.App. 1977) (cab company
had no duty to protect decedent from intentional criminal conduct of third parties, even
though it knowingly dispatched driver to a high crime area; further, "duty implied from the
contractual arrangement is also limited by foreseeability .... ").
12. As a general rule, there is implied in every contract for work or services a
duty to perform it skillfully, diligently, and in a workmanlike manner ... With
respect to the skill required of a person who is to render services, it is a well-
settled rule that the standard of comparison... is the degree of skill, effeciency,
and knowledge possessed by those of ordinary skill, competency, and standing
in the particular trade or business for which he is employed.
17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 371 (1964). See Graulich v. Frederic H. Berlowe & Assoc., Inc.,
338 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1976) and Gosselin v. Better Homes, Inc., 256 A.2d 629,
639-40 (Me. 1969).
CURB ON TECHNOLOGY
however, it is first necessary to determine what general standards of
care are expected from businesses which hold confidential data.13 If
the injured party can prove the enterprise failed to exercise the stan-
dard of care required, he may recover. The problem is that there
are no generally accepted standards with which to ascertain the de-
gree of security required of any business. Thus, practitioners must
persuasively argue that the business failed to meet even the most
basic level of protection.
In summary, a business is not strictly liable to persons injured
as a result of unauthorized access to data. Liability depends upon
the standard of care expected from the business holding the data.
The enormous variety of computer applications in business, coupled
with powerful computer network technology, make it desirable that
modem, meaningful standards of due care exist for the protection of
computerized data against unauthorized access. With regard to the
businesses in the previous hypotheticals, let us consider the stan-
dards of care generally applied to see whether a victim might be
compensated.
D. Standards of Care in Various Situations
1. Law Office Case
Generally, a lawyer must take only reasonable precautions
against unauthorized access to files.14 If an attorney kept his
records in a safe, and a team of highly trained commandos broke
into his office and blew open the safe, he would not be liable for the
loss, since only extraordinary measures would protect against such
action.
However, suppose the attorney left his records in a washroom
and they wound up in his adversary's office. One would expect a
jury to hold the attorney liable because his actions were unreasona-
ble, and because he appears to have breached his duty of care in
failing to perform his services in an "ordinary workmanlike
manner."'
15
Although these scenarios seem extreme, there are equally ex-
13. See generally KEETON, DOBBS, KEETON, AND OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS 383-85 (5th ed. 1984). Even if the obligation in tort exists to control the conduct of
others, it "requires only that the defendant exercise reasonable care." Id. at 385.
14. See generally 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys At Law § 199 (1980). Even in contract, the
attorney is obliged to perform only with the degree of efficiency and knowledge possessed by
those of ordinary skill and competency within the field. 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 371
(1964).
15. Expert testimony is generally required as to the standard of care and the degree of
defendant's deviance from the standard, unless the conduct complained of is not related to
1989]
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treme circumstances that might occur with regard to computer
data. For example, suppose an attorney has a modern computer-
ized law office. KGB-trained operatives, posing as carpet cleaners,
install a device which captures electronic emanations from the law-
yer's terminal. 6 Whatever the lawyer types into his minicomputer
is captured by the interloper. Surely the attorney would not be held
liable, since only extraordinary measures could prevent such an
event and KGB action is not reasonably foreseeable.
What if the situation is less clear. Assume a computer terminal
is located in a law office work area which is often unattended.
Taped to one side of the terminal is a piece of paper stating
"JURIS" and taped to the other side is a piece of paper stating,
among other things, ABC Company = 3115B. A person barely
computer literate could figure out that "JURIS" is the password,
and the data fie number for ABC Company is 3115B. Thus, one
would simply sign on using the password and request document
3115B to view strategy on the ABC Company case. In fact, one
could even "steal" the data by photographing or printing it, and the
attorney might not even be aware that it had been stolen.
One would expect the jury to find that the lawyer had violated
due care in this situation because he failed to take reasonable pre-
cautions to prevent unauthorized access. However, the injured
party would have difficulty persuading the court that the attorney
failed to meet "generally-accepted industry-wide standards" since
none exist with regard to computer security.17 Even if liability is
legal expertise. See Olfe v. Gordon, 93 Wis. 2d 173, 181, 286 N.W.2d 573, 577 (1980). Either
way, the lawyer should be liable for his conduct in the text example.
16. See PROTECTION OF COMPUTER SYSTEMS AND SOFTWARE 184-85 (F.L. Huband &
1.D. Shelton, eds. 1986). [hereinafter COMPUTER SYSTEMS] (for brief technical explanation.
It is true that this type of risk is generally confined to national security applications; all the
more reason why a lawyer would not ordinarily be concerned with it), See also R. Kessler,
Moscow Station, Time, Feb. 20, 1989 at 50, 51 (bugs implanted by KGB in Selectric type-
writers at U.S. Embassy in Moscow).
17. In Practical Offset, Inc. v. Davis, 83 IlL. App. 3d 566, 404 N.E.2d 516 (1980), sum-
mary judgment for legal malpractice was aflrmed against a lawyer who failed to file a financ-
ing statement necessary to perfect a security interest. The court reasoned that the lawyer's
employment included responsibility for filing the statement, and that "where the record dis-
closed such an obvious, explicit, and undisputed breach of the attorney's duty of care, expert
testimony as to the applicable standard of care would not be required.. .it is quite possible the
common sense of laymen could be relied upon to provide the requisite standard of care." 404
N.E.2d at 523 (emphasis added).
Perhaps one could also say that the lawyer's employment extends to "common sense"
measures to protect client data against hackers. Query: what in laymen's common sense




found in this specific case, what precedent would be set for the less
extreme situations?
2. Hospital Case
A hospital is clearly under an affirmative duty to protect its
patients from physical harm by third persons.'" However, if one
patient is injured by another, no action will lie against the hospital
unless it can be shown that the risk was reasonably foreseeable.' 9
Thus, a hospital would probably be liable if it had so little security
that outsiders could enter its unmanned patient records' area and
wreak havoc.
Is the hospital equally charged with implementing measures to
keep hackers out of its computerized patient record files? Could a
jury be convinced that the risk of injury to patients is foreseeable
such that counter-measures should have been taken to prevent such
a break-in? If so, what sort of measures would be adequate to sat-
isfy the requirements of due care?
20
3. Service Bureau Case
With regard to the standard of care required for a small service
company, assume you are the attorney for the ABC Service Bureau,
a small firm that performs outside data processing services for other
companies. Assume that a new IRS regulation requires that em-
ployers who file a substantial amount of salary and pension infor-
mation items on Forms W-2 or W-2P must do so using magnetic
18. See PROSSER & KEETON 383.
19. Sylvester v. Northwestern Hosp. of Minneapolis, 236 Minn. 384, 53 N.W.2d 17
(1952) (hospital should have known in this case that intoxicated patient wandering about
unguarded would be a danger to other patients).
20. Possible computer security measures are discussed subsequently in this paper. To
give the reader some idea of the elementary concepts involved: (1) Even if there is a general
password to access a hospital file, each authorized individual should also have a password
that is unique and not known to other individuals; (2) The password should not be a proper
name, common hospital term, or other easily-guessed item. It should be changed regularly.
These mandates should be enforced by software; (3) After a small number of incorrect pass-
words, the line into the computer should be disconnected and security personnel promptly
notified; (4) Encryption should be considered if extremely sensitive data is involved; (5) A
contingency plan should be developed and tested in the event that phone lines into the com-
puter are down for an extended period of time, ensuring that the computer can be updated
"on site;" (6) Access control software should clearly define what users can access what data,
under what conditions, and supported by a proper chain of authorized signatures; (7) Viola-
tion reports should be manageable and designed to produce adequate follow-up action; (8)
Regular audits of computer security should be conducted by personnel trained in technical
and administrative techniques, who are not employed by the data processing department.
Query: are these measures considered "generally-accepted standards" of due care with re-
gard to computer security?
19891
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media.21
As expected, several small and medium-size companies with
insufficient data processing resources of their own contact ABC.
While business prospects are good, ABC is concerned about its lia-
bility in the event of a break-in. Since tax information is highly
sensitive, ABC wonders if it should accept the jobs; particularly if
we assume terminal operators in offices throughout the state input
data over telephone lines to the central office.
What if someone intercepted data in transmission, or somehow
accessed the company's central files? What liability would ABC
face if this personal tax and salary information were disclosed?
What is the effect of a contract clause that ABC "use the utmost
care at all times to protect the confidentiality of the data being
converted?"22
As ABC's attorney, you must determine the standard of care
ABC will be held to in the event of a break-in. More practically,
you must establish what ABC must do to protect itself from
liability.
4. Additional Examples
Aside from liability in tort or contract, there are additional ba-
ses for liability caused by unauthorized access. For example,
wrongful access or disclosure could result in violations of privacy,
due process, or defamation. Several such possibilities, as suggested
by recent literature, are listed briefly.2 3
Although many diverse groups have legitimate needs for ob-
taining personal data, easy accessibility to this information raises
privacy concerns. For example, hospital patient records may be ac-
cessed by insurance companies, government statisticians, and medi-
21. 26 C.F.R. § 301.6011-2 (1986). For tax year 1986, this regulation applies to em-
ployers who file 500 or more such forms. For tax year 1987, the threshold is reduced to 250
forms. If you don't comply, and haven't received a hardship waiver, you are deemed not to
have filed, and may therefore incur all the attendant penalties.
The purpose of this regulation is to speed up tax processing of employee wage items.
After 20 years of trying voluntary persuasion, the government finally gave up and concluded
that it had no choice but to force businesses to modernize. IRS Requires Filing Tax Return
Information on Magnetic Media, COMPUTER L. AND TAX REP., Sept. 1986, at 5.
22. See, ag., R. RAYSMAN & P. BROWN, COMPUTER LAW: DRAFTING AND NEGOTI-
ATING FORMS AND AGREEMENTS 10.05 [3]-[4] (1987). [hereinafter RAYSMAN & BROWN].
The vendor may be obliged to protect the client's data, but by what standards is that obliga-
tion measured? Is there a level of protection below which the vendor has breached the
contract?
23. See T. Soloman, Personal Privacy and the "1984" Syndrome, 7 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 753, 760-771 (1985).
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cal administrators. A patient's private life could be compromised
by the disclosure of his medical file. An example would be an AIDS
patient who loses his job because his medical condition was made
public through unauthorized access to his computerized medical
records. Additionally, law enforcement officials have proposed a na-
tional Computerized Criminal History (CCH) system as a means of
gathering intelligence. Is it possible to maintain privacy or integrity
in a data base which contains information on tens of millions of
persons and is accessible to tens of thousands of persons
countrywide?24
In a less noble vein, data bases have been developed listing over
two million Americans who have filed malpractice and product lia-
bility lawsuits,25 and another listing over a half million women who
wear petite dress sizes. 6 The possibilities for additional personal
data bases are endless.27 While each may be built up innocently
enough, there are no standard procedures to protect against an in-
vasion of privacy which might be caused by the unauthorized gath-
ering and dissemination of the personal information generated.
Due process concerns may also be raised by unauthorized computer
access. For example, a computer network was designed in San
Francisco which allowed individuals working from a local police
department computer to access public defender files. While no due
process violations were established, a court could have found a de-
fendant's constitutional rights were infringed through a violation of
the attorney-client privilege.2 8 So, even without evidence of actual
wrongdoing, a potentially dangerous criminal could have been re-
leased through an inadvertent disclosure.29 Despite the magnitude
of this mistake, there still appear to be no generally-accepted com-
24. See K. LANDON, DOSSIER SOCIETY (1986). See also Olmos, Civil Rights Issues Fuel
LA. 's Warrant Systems Changes, COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 29, 1984, at 10 (Incorrect com-
puter data caused arrest of the wrong man. Time in jail forced him to drop out of college and
be called to active duty for missing reserve meetings.) Error could have just as easily been
caused maliciously by hackers as accidently.
25. P. Elmer-Dewitt, An Electronic Assault on Privacy: Computer Blacklists Have Be-
come a New Growth Industry, TIME, May 19, 1986, at 104.
26. W. Rempel, Dossier Society; Computers: Is Privacy the Loser?, L.A. Times, July 29,
1986, at 1, col. 1.
27. See also R. Brooke, Machine to Sell LLR.R. [Long Island Railroad] Tickets by
Credit Card, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1986, § B, at 3, col. 1.
28. K. Sullivan, Police Face Allegations of Accessing Confidential Files, COMPUTER
WORLD, Feb. 25, 1985, at 8.
29. Telephone conversation with Jay Bloom Becker, Director, National Center for
Computer Crime Data (NCCCD), 2700 North Cahuenga Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90068
(213-874-8233) (March 14, 1988) (advising that no actual violation had been found).
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puter standards to prevent a recurrence of such an incident in the
future.
Finally, unauthorized access may result in any number of
claims against management. In the famous case of Dun & Brad-
street v. Greenmoss Builders,3" the company's management was held
liable for defamation when a false and damaging credit report was
produced due to the negligence of a poorly-supervised high school
employee. The United States Supreme Court allowed punitive dam-
ages to be awarded without a showing of actual malice because the
erroneous statements did not involve matters of public concern.31
A future case could just as easily find negligence and award punitive
damages if the lack of computer security permitted hackers to cor-
rupt the data base, causing defamatory statements to be issued.
These examples are not exhaustive. The potential for harm is
as unlimited as are modem computer applications themselves. The
question remains: are there applicable legal standards which indi-
cate the minimum level of security needed to prevent liability from
unauthorized computer access and abuse? 2
E. General Standards of Care
1. Lack of Generally-Accepted Standards
Surprisingly, there are no generaliy-accepted industry-wide
standards of due care for the protection of computerized data, and
even more surprising is the fact that computer security principles
have been well known to practitioners for over a decade.33 Thus,
presently, enterprises which hold computerized data are virtually
free from liability for harm caused by unauthorized access, even
though methods to protect that data are common knowledge in the
industry.
30. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
31. Id at 763.
32. Cf 12 C.F.R. § 21.3 and § 21 Appendix A (1986) (bank vault standards).
33. The first technical discussion of computer security in its own right was held in 1967.
Ware, Computer Security Standards for Government and Industry: Where Will they Come
From?, COMPUTER SECURrry J. 71 (Spring 1983) [hereinafter Ware]. Much subsequent re-
search from that conference was classified until 1976. Id. However, computer security funda-
mentals filtered out to the business community starting in the early 1970's. See, e.g., Martin,
supra note 4; Hoffman, supra note 4. It is interesting to observe that the 1967 conference was
held three years after the introduction of the modem "third generation" of computers, the
IBM System/360, on April 7, 1964. G. SHELLY & T. CASHMAN, COMPUTER FUNDAMEN-
TALS WrrH APPLICATION SOFrWARE 2.12 (1986) [hereinafter SHELLY & CASHMAN].
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2. Consequences of Lack of Standards
Although the lack of generally-accepted industry-wide
(GAIW) standards of due care seem unbelievable to some, there are
managers that feel the lack of standards is economical and even
beneficial to their businesses. Without standards, they do not feel
the need to purchase security software or encryption devices, de-
velop and test contingency plans, or educate their staffs in security
procedures. They believe that a victim's attorney faces the insur-
mountable task of convincing a lay jury that a certain computer
security technique is expected of persons with ordinary competence
and standing in the business, that failure to implement this tech-
nique caused the damage, and that the business holding the data
should be held liable for that damage.
Despite the shortsighted validity of these beliefs, the present
lack of GAIW standards may harm these same businesses for two
reasons. First, the lack of GAIW standards lulls businesses into a
false sense of security that their failure to implement security sys-
tems cannot lead to liability. With the rapid advance of technology
in modern society, liability for computer negligence seems inevita-
ble, and businesses should recognize the risk of substantial liability
in the future for their failure to implement security measures now.
Juries, aided by expert witnesses, will eventually realize the injustice
of a private enterprise shielding itself from liability solely by relying
on the mystique of computers. Standards would provide some ob-
jective means by which a business could be reasonably certain that
it has met its obligations to the public.34 Second, in addition to fail-
ing to protect individuals from unauthorized access, the lack of
GAIW standards also fails to protect those same businesses from
computer crime.35 Such standards would not eliminate computer
abuse, especially by "insiders;" they would not eliminate computer-
related negligence. They would, however, provide a "curb on tech-
nology," a baseline from which to judge both compensation for vic-
tims of computer abuse and the efficacy of measures to combat
36
computer crime.Many business managers believe that computer security con-
34. "A standard is something you put in place so that no one is penalized as you go to it
in the future." S. Diamond, Unscrambling Data Security, COMPUTERS IN BANKING, April
1987, at 76, 81.
35. Most computer security measures which protect individual privacy also, felici-
tously, guard against computer crime. See generally MARTIN, supra note 4, Chapter 2;
FISHER, supra note 4, Chapter 5.
36. The fact that standards of due care for the protection of computerized data do not
currently exist in the industry cannot, in itself, show that prudence does not dictate the need
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trols are not cost effective to combat losses from computer crime.37
While there is an element of truth to this belief,38 standardized con-
trols would bring about economies of scale that could ultimately
lessen the financial burden.39 An understanding of the need for
GAIW standards must start with an understanding of the principles
of computer security.
III. COMPUTER SECURITY DEMYSTIFIED: IDENTIFYING
PROBLEMS OF "DUE CARE" IN THE PROTECTION OF
COMPUTERIZED DATA
A. The Need for Understanding
There are several reasons why a lawyer would need a working
knowledge of computer security. First, she may be involved in tort
litigation representing a plaintiff who has been injured by the failure
of a business enterprise to protect its computerized data against
hackers. Second, she may be involved in a criminal case where a
critical question is the defendant's right to access certain data.40
for such standards. But cf. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cerr denied, 287 U.S. 662
(1932).
37. See, eg., Tompkins, Jergenson, Kossack & Proctor, Report on Computer Crime,
1984, TASK FORCE ON COMPUTER CRIME, A.B.A. SEC. OF CRIM. JUST. 40-43 [hereinafter
A.B.A. Report] (ack of awareness and concern by management regarding computer crime);
A. BEQUAI, supra note 4, at 11-15 (management pridefully secures file cabinets but neglects
to secure computerized files).
38. As stated in the seminal text on computer security: "Security and accuracy controls
increase the cost of a computer system and in some cases degrade its performance somewhat.
Furthermore, they do not give absolute safety, but a measure of it." J. MARTIN, supra note 4,
at 43. This is as true today as when written, but of course it is true in general of all adminis-
trative and regulatory systems, and the cost element is always less burdensome if the proce-
dures are standardized.
39. Discussing encryption, which is absolutely essential for banks but not always uti-
lized, one contemporary writer observed:
[W]hether because of budget restraints or personnel shortages, encryption al-
ways seems to take second place to everything else on the priority list .... The
situation may be changing somewhat [since] the banking committee of the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) [is proposing] standards re-
lated to encryption. A final encryption standard should be approved by early
next year. Although the ANSI standards are not binding, they serve to in-
crease awareness of security issues and act as rallying points for banks con-
cerned about implementing security procedures.
Diamond, supra note 34, at 77 (emphasis added).
40. Nearly every state has some sort of computer crime statute. Computer Crime Stat-
utes, J. OF THE COMPUTER L. A., Spring 1986, at 13.' For up-to-the-minute information,
contact Jay Bloom Becker, Esq., see supra note 29.
Some state statutes make the fact of unauthorized access itself an offense, without regard
to actual harm caused (i.e., money theft, theft of services, invasion of privacy, malicious dam-
age or disruption). CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-251b (West 1985) reads in part:
(1) A person is guilty of the computer crime of unauthorized access to a computer sys-
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Third, she may be drafting a contract in which one party wishes to
insist that the other use the utmost care in protecting computerized
data, to the point of defining that level of care with technical speci-
ficity.4 Fourth, as counsel to firms dealing in computerized data,
she may need a general understanding of that area to protect the
firm from whatever problems might arise.
While lawyers think it obvious that one does not need to be a
doctor to try a medical malpractice case or an architect to file suit
for injuries sustained in a building collapse, it is just as obvious that
one need not be an expert in computer internals to litigate or coun-
sel on computer security matters. However, one must know some-
tern when, knowing that he is not authorized to do so, he accesses or causes to be
accessed any computer system without authorization.
(2) It shall be an affirmative defense... that:
(A) The person reasonably believed that the owner of the computer system, or
a person empowered to license access thereto, had authorized him to ac-
cess;... or (C) the person reasonably could not have known that his access
was unauthorized.
It is not always clear-cut whether a person "knew he was not authorized" to
access a system, or if he "reasonably believed that he had been or would have been
empowered to do so." These factual questions may be influenced by the security
that actually exists at the organization in question (i.e., how strong is password
protection? How up-to-date are access rules? How seriously are violations han-
dled? What security education and awareness efforts are undertaken, and at what
level?) Further, it is unclear whether legitimate access to a system, followed by
unauthorized access to certain data within the system, would be a violation. And
what of access on Saturday, if an individual had been authorized access for weekday
working hours only?
CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(d) (West Supp. 1987) reads in part: Any person who
intentionally and without authorization accesses any computer system,. .. or data,
with knowledge that the access was not authorized, shall be guilty of a public of-
fense. This... shall not apply to any person who accesses his or her employer's
computer system,... when acting within the scope of his or her employment. The
reference to "or data" presumably handles the problem of legitimate access to a
system followed by unauthorized access to certain data in the system. But the stat-
ute's exemption of employees acting within the scope of their employment invites
the same types of questions as the Connecticut statute. "Scope of employment" will
surely depend upon accepted organizationalpractices.
TExAs PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.02 (Vernon Supp. 1989) reads in part:
(a) A person commits an offense if the person: ... (2) gains access to data
stored or maintained by a computer without the effective consent of the owner
or licensee of the data and the actor knows that there exists a computer secur-
ity system intended to prevent him from gaining access to that data.
Of course, "effective consent" is another way of stating the problems raised by the Con-
necticut statute. The Texas statute appears to require that the business have a security sys-
tem in place before initiating a prosecution. However, the degree of technical strength of the
system, its level of maintenance, and its effective administration, are not defined. It is too
easy to conceive of the existence of an ineffective "computer security system" whose sole
purpose is to demonstrate an element of the offense!
41. Cf supra note 22.
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thing. This section attempts to guide the reader through a study of
selected existing materials.42
B. Functional Elements of a Computer System
It is impossible to understand the language of computer secur-
ity without a picture of the functional elements of a computer sys-
tem. Figure 1 provides a simplified model of these elements. For a
more detailed study, the reader is encouraged to purchase a copy of
Shelly & Cashman.43 It is essential to understand the flow of infor-
mation through the system, to appreciate the vulnerabilities and
necessary safeguards for protecting computerized data in a cost ef-
fective manner.'
Input devices attached to the processor include keypunch, tape
drives, key-to-disk systems, optical character readers, and magnetic
ink character recognition units.45 Each device translates raw infor-
mation into machine-readable data and places it into the computer
processor's main memory; thus, these devices need to be physically
attached to the processor."
42. Many persons fear to delve into technical matters that may be "over their heads."
But the truth is that no one is an expert on everything; the trick is to understand as much as
you need so as to make proper use of experts when necessary. Even in the computer field,
expertness is relative. Few of the top-flight computer programmers understand the engineer-
ing and physics necessary for digital computer hardware to function; very few understand the
high-level algebra underlying compiler design, which permits them to write English-like code
that a binary machine can operate upon. This presents no difficulty: they understand as
much as they need to solve the problem at hand.
43. See SHELLY & CASHMAN, supra note 33. The book is available from Boyd & Fraser
Publishing Co., Boston, MA. It is, in the author's opinion, the best introduction to computer
fundamentals written to date.
The reader should understand that the model presented in this paper is not a textbook of
computer fundamentals and cannot substitute for one. SHELLY & CASHMAN is highly rec-
ommended for all readers not totally conversant with large-scale computer system theory. It
is lavishly illustrated and superbly organized. One could profit from reading the entire text,
including chapter summaries, but omitting research projects and software package instruc-
tions if time is limited. Even those persons fairly conversant with the subject matter could
profit from the book as a reference and refresher for any uncertain concepts. This paper shall
refer to it repeatedly in footnotes.
With regard to the model in Figure 1, see SHELLY & CASHMAN, supra note 33, at 1.1-
1.37 (reinforcement and illustration of model, including examples of large computer installa-
tions and personal computers for home and business use). See also id. at 2.1-2.33 (evolution
of computers from the early days to modern advanced applications).
Readers who instead desire a briefer, non-illustrated written summary of computer sys-
tem fundamentals are referred to A. BEQUAI, supra note 4, at 94-103 ("Basics of the System,"
etc.).
44. See SHELLY & CASHMAN, supra note 33, at 3.1-3.5.
45. See id. at 5.1-5.33 (illustrated device descriptions).
46. See id. at 4.1-4.27 (overview of input processing modes and brief introduction to
data communications).
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"Data communications" is the term commonly used for send-
ing data over channels such as telephone lines, coaxial cables, mi-
crowaves, or fibre optics.47 A modem converts digital data from the
communications terminal into analog signals suitable for transmis-
sion, then converts the analog signals back to digital data for com-
puter processing.48 There are two methods for establishing the
communication link between a terminal and processor: leased lines
and switched lines.49 Leased lines are permanent connections be-
47. Data communications is also known as "telecommunications" or "teleprocessing."
48. See id. at 11.1-11.13 (elements of data communications). Note that the network
model shown as Figure 11.2 on page 11.3 fits our model.
49. See id. at 11.13-11.14.
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tween the two devices and are also known as "dedicated," "direct,"
or "private" lines. Examples include lines between the White
House and the Kremlin or between a corporation's home office and
its branch.
Since it is too expensive to have leased lines between devices
throughout the country, switched lines, also known as "public"
lines, are common. Switched lines are available from the telephone
company and utilize standard telephone company switching de-
vices. A data communications system in which users dial into the
computer via switched lines has come to be known as a "dial-up
system" and is particularly vulnerable to hackers attempting to
enter the computer system.
The input data are read into main memory as application
data.5" The application program, which tells the computer how to
act upon this data, is also read into main memory, usually from
auxiliary storage.51 In addition, portions of the operating system
(O/S) are present in main memory. O/S is most easily thought of
as "common routines," i.e., programs which may be used by all ap-
plication programs, pre-written for data processing convenience. 52
The Central Processing Unit (CPU) is the "heart" of the com-
puter and contains the circuitry which enables the system to func-
tion. The Control Unit handles the complex task of switching
between various input/output devices and the processor in order to
process data accurately and completely.53 The Arithmetic-Logic
Unit (ALU) performs standard arithmetic operations and logical
comparisons.54
In theory, all the data needed to run the computer system
could reside permanently in main memory or be entered via input
devices. In practice, however, this is unworkable because of the
50. See id. at 8.1-8.14 (discussion of binary electronic data storage and various types of
computer memory). See also id. at 8.17-8.19 (illustration of semiconductor memory manu-
facture). Problems with protecting semiconductor chip design led to passage of the Semicon-
ductor Chip Protection Act of 1984. See generally Kidwell, Software and Semiconductors:
Why Are We Confused?, 70 MiNN. L. REV. 533 (1985).
51. See SHELLY & CASHMAN, supra note 33, at 12.1-12.11 (general nature of applica-
tion programs); see also id. at 13.1-13.13 (brief fundamentals of programming languages).
For further information on the application development process, see id. at 15.1-15.15 (sys-
tems analysis) and 16.1-16.31 (program analysis).
52. See id. at 14.1-14.8 (brief overview of this incredibly complex subject). Note that
O/S contains, in general, two types of programs: those which make it possible for the applica-
tion program to function (i.e., load, compile, execute), and "utilities" which make application
programming easier (i.e., sort and file management).
53. See id. at 8.14-8.17.
54. See id. at 3.5-3.9. A logical comparison determines if one data item is greater than,
equal to, or less than another data item.
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enormous volume of programs and data in typical organizations.
Storing it all in the main memory would be too expensive and input-
ting it with each program run would be excruciatingly slow. There-
fore, auxiliary storage typically holds the great majority of
application programs, data files and tables used by these programs.
Auxiliary storage is often referred to as an "electronic file cabinet."
Devices include magnetic tape, hard disk, floppy disk or diskette,
and certain exotic instruments such as bubble memory." Most
software security systems are particularly concerned with protect-
ing auxiliary storage since it is typically accessible to the full com-
puter system and contains the master files for many different
applications.
Output devices take data from main memory and record it
physically. 6 Typical output devices include printers, terminals,
and plotters. However, certain output is not directly human-reada-
ble, such as computer output microfilm (COM) or voice output.57
The model in Figure 1 remains accurate for any computer sys-
tem as long as one important fact is recognized: a computer system
is not limited to one set of input devices or one processor, nor must
the input devices and processors all be located at the same site. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates a general "network", 5" a logical grouping of com-
puters and terminals connected by a communications system. 9
Although a network has infinite possible configurations, they will
all feature some kind of link among computers, terminals, and
channels.
Each processor within a network will contain the components
defined in Figure 1. However, instead of configuring the organiza-
tion around one computer center as Figure 1 might imply, a com-
puter system might be designed around organizational realities,
often referred to as "distributed data processing. '
In addition to its universal application, Figure 1 holds for all
known technologies. Computer system advances which increase
speed, reliability, and flexibility, or which decrease cost, space, and
power requirements, will not change any of the elements of the ba-
55. See id. at 9.1-9.19.
56. See 1d. at 3.9-3.10.
57. See id. at 6.1-6.27 (illustrated device descriptions). See also id. at 7.1-7.23 (illustra-
tion of actual user interface with computer system, using terminal as input/output device).
58. See H. KATZAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO DISTRIBUTED DATA PROCESSING 53, 119
(1978); SHELLY & CASHMAN, supra note 33, at 11.15-11.17 (illustration and amplification of
this discussion).
59. KATZAN, supra note 58, at 53.
60. KATzAN, supra note 58, at 110.
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sic functional model.61
C. Basic Elements of Computer Security
1. Note on Data Exposures
In order to develop a working knowledge of computer security,
a lawyer needs to familiarize himself with its basic elements. How-
ever, the subject is too broad to be extensively covered in this arti-
cle. Thus, this discussion will guide the reader through some
selected existing material. For a deeper understanding of the con-
cepts presented, the reader is encouraged to obtain copies of Hu-
band and of Fisher.62
Computer security generally is concerned with the implemen-
tation of controls to meet exposures.63 Normally, however, only
cost effective controls are considered.61 This implies that a business
enterprise will measure the cost of a given security control against
the reduced loss exposure which would result from its implementa-
tion and then decide whether and in what manner to install the
control. Such a process is usually termed a "risk assessment" or
"risk analysis." The reader might assume that businesses regularly
perform security risk assessments 65, but because of complications
involved and the lack of reliability in the process, this is not the
61. This statement may be difficult for the layman to accept. The major reason for its
validity is that basic computer architecture has not changed in principle since the "stored
program concept" was developed by von Neumann in 1945. See SHELLY & CASHMAN, supra
note 33, at 2.4 ("although accepted as 'modus operandi' today, [the stored program] concept
was a brilliant breakthrough in 1945."); R.G. GARSIDE, THE ARCHITECTURE OF DIGITAL
COMPUTERS 1-31 (1980) (a magnificent text for persons conversant with basic computer
internals).
62. See COMPUTER SYSTEMS supra note 16; R. FISHER, supra note 4. Unfortunately,
there is no one text, to the author's knowledge, that does for computer security fundamentals
what SHELLY & CASHMAN does for general computer fundamentals. There are several excel-
lent books and articles in the field, but as of this writing, there is no one single text which is
consistently at the proper level for lawyers: some are too technical, some are too wordy, some
are too product-specific, etc. Most of what is needed can be found in these two books, and
this paper shall refer to them frequently in footnotes.
COMPUTER SYSTEMS, supra note 16, also contains valuable information on software
piracy, protection of proprietary rights, and state and federal computer crime legislation.
The author highly recommends this text for computer lawyers with a technical bent.
It should be noted for completeness that the seminal text in computer security is J.
MARTIN, supra note 4. All computer security books owe a debt to Martin and usually ac-
knowledge that. The best readable technical book in the field is L. HOFFMAN, supra note 4.
This paper shall occasionally refer to it in footnotes, but it is optional for the general reader.
The author apologizes for any injustice done to other authorities. New materials contin-
ually appear in this field, but we have to start somewhere.
63. See supra note 4.
64. See COMPUTER SYSTEMS supra note 16, at 179; R. FISHER, supra note 4, at 80.
65. "Typically, a risk assessment process is used to select a combination of management
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case. It is virtually impossible with current technology to determine
precisely the total set of exposures, the potential annualized loss
from each exposure, the true cost of often-overlapping controls, and
the resulting reduced annualized loss from each exposure." There-
fore, in practice, controls are generally implemented only after an
exposure occurs and is recognized as a problem by management.
There is no known general model of computer security expo-
sures. Therefore, even though the very definition of computer se-
curity implies that the lawyer must study data exposures in as much
detail as data controls, in practice, this is impossible. A lawyer may
safely assume that huge potential losses may result from the acci-
dental or intentional disclosure of data to unauthorized persons, or
from the unauthorized modification or destruction of data.67 In
view of the enormous potential for loss caused by data exposures,
68
it is clear that controls are essential to protect individuals and
businesses.69
and technical controls that provides protection from those risks which are of most concern."
COMPUTER SYSTEMs supra note 16, at 180.
"[Tihe most appropriate time for a [risk analysis] is before the consideration of con-
trols." R. FISHER supra note 4, at 81 (emphasis in original).
These statements, while perfectly logical, amount to "wishful thinking" in today's com-
puter security environment.
66. See R. FISHER, supra note 4, at 82-98, for a description of the standard risk assess-
ment process. The extreme complications necessary to achieve a result in which no one has
much confidence explains why the method is generally in disuse. No doubt one day, as con-
trols are standardized and as consequential losses due to security exposures are better under-
stood, there will exist more satisfactory risk assessment algorithms.
67. See R. FISHER, supra note 4, at 5 1-53, for a good brief general outline of data secur-
ity exposures. With regard to the Figure 1 model, certain general examples of data exposures
are apparent. This is by no means an exhaustive list:
(1) Input devices: passwords and general instructions taped onto terminals; looking
over someone's shoulder to "steal" a password; dialing in to a computer system not author-
ized for your use; entering fraudulent data.
(2) Communication Channels: wiretapping; sabotaging lines.
(3) Processor/Computer Center: fire, flood, and other Acts of God; riots and sabotage;
power failure and brownout.
(4) Application Programs: logic bombs (computer virus or other software sabotage);
program errors; erroneous duplicate processing.
(5) O/S: unauthorized access to O/S, which disrupts all application programs.
(6) Auxiliary Storage: unauthorized access to another's files (intentional or not); drop-
ping tapes and disks; writing over live data on media.
(7) Output: routing sensitive output to the wrong terminal; using proprietary printouts
for scrap paper; stealing or selling output.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 23-31 for some practical examples. No one
quite knows the cost of computer crime in the U.S. One oft-quoted figure is that white collar
crime losses exceed $40 billion annually in the private sector alone. A. BEQUAI, supra note 4,
at 6. Computer-related crime must comprise a portion of this figure.
69. The reader is reminded that the following discussion of computer security controls
is not a textbook and cannot substitute for one. It is intended, along with the previous sec-
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2. Categories of Controls
There are an infinite number of security measures which can be
taken to protect against accidental or intentional exposures. How-
ever, to simplify this discussion, this article considers computer se-
curity controls as a system of five major categories.7 0
a. Physical Security Controls
Physical security controls have two main objectives: to restrict
access to facilities, and to protect hardware and software from dam-
tion, to give the lawyer a working knowledge of the general nature of computer security. The
appropriate textbook in the area has yet to be written and probably will not be until a greater
degree of standardization develops.
70. Every writer expresses it a little differently, but the categories presented here are not
inconsistent with those of any recognized authority.
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age if disaster occurs.71 These are the "traditional" controls which
previously consisted of locks, guards, and fences. Today they may
encompass such sophisticated devices as minicomputer-driven ac-
cess restriction mechanisms, smoke detection devices and concealed
alarm systems.72
Although physical security controls are essential to a properly-
secured environment, they are inadequate by themselves for two
reasons. First, many offenses against data are committed by fully
authorized persons. Second, with modem data communications
technology, it is no longer necessary to be physically located at the
data center to cause harm to the system.73
b. Access Control Software
Access control software consists of mechanisms built into the
computer system itself with three objectives in mind: to keep unau-
thorized users out of the system, to restrict authorized users to data
specifically allowed to them, and to report attempted violations for
corrective action.74 Access control software is the heart of any com-
puter security system. Its viability clearly depends upon proving
the identity of the person attempting to access the system. This is
usually done via a password.
Although access control software is essential in any modem
computer security system, it is inadequate by itself. It does not solve
the problem of wiretapping communication lines, and as a technical
measure, it offers no self-assurance that it is being correctly imple-
mented and controlled.
c. Dial-up Controls
Recall that data communications users may access a system
using one of two communication methods: leased lines or switched
(dial-up) lines.7 5 If secure access control software is in place, then
71. See COMPUTER SYSTEMS supra note 16, at 183.
72. See R. FISHER, supra note 4, at 147-49 (questionnaire which illustrates the general
range of physical security controls). 'The reader may recall that organizations once were
proud to "show off" their data centers to the general public; very few do so now, as that is
considered a "security risk."
73. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
74. See COMPUTER SYSTEMs supra note 16, at 187. With regard to the Figure 1 model,
these controls are intended to: prevent unauthorized users from accessing the system via
terminals; prevent authorized users from accessing data in main memory or auxiliary storage
except as specifically authorized for them and in the manner authorized; and produce output
sufficient to permit system administrators to take prompt and responsible action against vio-
lators. These controls are considered in more detail in § III-D infra.
75. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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the communication method should be totally irrelevant as far as
security is concerned. Hackers with the installation phone number
will still be prevented from accessing the system by lack of a valid
password. However, as subsequently discussed 76, access control
software is far from ideal, and the weaknesses of passwords as an
authentication device is legendary. Therefore, since hackers will
often try to access a system via dial-up, many installations use dial-
up security controls to provide an additional level of security.
Dial-up security devices are often known as port protection de-
vices (PPDs).7 7 Presently, PPDs use one of two general methods to
increase security over traditional access control passwords.
The first method requires all dial-up users to enter an "access
code," often via touch-tone pad on their telephone set or via the
terminal keyboard itself. Once this code is accepted, the user is in
the system, but he will still be subject to any access control software
measures that exist. In effect, the access code is an additional pass-
word; thus, the hacker must know two passwords instead of one in
order to gain access to the computerized data.78
The second method features what is known as "call-back." The
system associates a telephone number with each user's access code.
Upon receiving a valid access code, the system disconnects the
caller and automatically places a return phone call to the expected
number. If that call goes through, connection to the system is es-
tablished. Therefore, the hacker must not only have a valid user's
access code but must be at the valid user's expected location as well.
Call-back provides an extra measure of security, but it is not exten-
sively used as of this writing. Drawbacks include: extra time to
make the connection, extra phone costs, and lack of flexibility for
dealing with legitimate mobile users such as traveling salesper-
sons.79  PPDs do, however, fill the void left by access control
software.80 Thus, despite their inconvenience, their use may be jus-
tified where system data is extremely sensitive and additional pro-
tection is needed. 81
76. See infra notes 121-35 and accompanying text.
77. See COMPUTER SYSTEMS, supra note 16, at 186.
78. See id. at 199-200.
79. Id. at 200-201.
80. PPDs raise additional questions of their own, such as: how many tries should be
allowed to enter the correct access code? Should PPD's be managed by a group different
from that managing access control software? Id. at 201-202; see also id. at 202-207 (more
advanced discussion of technological considerations for device selection).
81. The author is aware that PPD's have occasionally been used in installations that
have no meaningful access control software. In that case, they are not an additional level of




Despite the system protection provided by access control
software and PPDs, the communication channel itself is still unpro-
tected. Encryption, concealing information by rendering it un-
recognizable to persons who do not possess decryption devices 2, is
the only known defense to wiretapping.8 3 In general, an "encryption
key" is used to encode data, and the same key must be used to de-
code the data. 4
There are two main types of encryption line encryption is the
traditional type and protects data sent over communication chan-
nels"5 and file encryption protects data while it resides on auxiliary
storage.8 6 Intruders who managed to access a fie without authori-
zation or managed to physically steal the device from the computer
center would still find that ifie unreadable unless they also had the
encryption key.
Specific cryptographic devices are now being developed to han-
dle new types of equipment and communication technology. They
vary widely by factors such as the extent of data protection within
the computer system, ease of use, strength of the encryption al-
gorithm, and implementation method. 7
e. Administrative Controls
Despite all of the protection provided by the technical controls
discussed above, access control software, PPDs, and encryption,
coupled with physical security, the security system may still be in-
adequate to protect an organization. Proper installation does not
ensure proper control and coordination of the devices, user educa-
tion", or preventitive future planning."
than nothing, although it may be worse than nothing if it lulls management into thinking it
has adequate computer security.
82. See id. at 187; see also L. HOFFMAN, supra note 4, at 42-91 (more technical discus-
sion of general cryptographic methods and their implementation in hardware and software).
83. See COMPUTER SYSTEMS supra note 16, at 215.
84. See id. at 207, 214.
85. See id. at 214-215 ("Communication Protection").
86. See id. at 215 ("Storage Protection"); see also supra note 55 and accompanying text
(discussion of auxiliary storage devices).
87. See COMPUTER SYSTEMS supra note 16, at 215-22 (additional technical details).
88. "The object of security education must be to obtain security by consent. It should
never be imposed without reason. Security must be seen to be reasonable and necessary....
J. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 393.
89. The author, along with most other computer security professionals, has dozens of
"war stories" discussing fine technological devices which were rendered useless due to poor
implementation and administration. In general, technical controls are implemented by tech-
nicians, who view computer security as a technical problem, and one which hopefully will not
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Administrative security controls establish and maintain poli-
cies, procedures, and guidelines to ensure that computer security
mechanisms are properly utilized. Administrative controls include
such measures as the establishment of a separate security unit
within the organization90 ; promulgation of security awareness and
education91; personnel policies such as job rotation, separation of
duties, and background checks9 2; contingency planning93 ; miscella-
neous devices such as business interruption insurance, inventory
control, and proprietary labelling; and, most recently, protection
against computer viruses.94
Ideally, administrative controls should be developed simultane-
ously with sound technical controls. Weak administration can
cause improper coordination with the technical controls, and weak
technical controls can reduce administrative controls to mere win-
dow-dressing.
D. Access Control Software Models
Access Control Software (ACS) as a security device must now
be considered in more detail. Assume that the ACS File is a file of
operating system data, "common routines" which reside in the
main memory. 95 The ACS file performs several specific functions
which will be considered below as a system of five categories. 96
1. Identification
ACS requires that all users be identified and held accountable
for their actions. Identification requires that a unique code, called
inhibit them in their special work. While computer security cannot function in a modem
environment without sophisticated technology, clearly it must be administered by persons
who sympathize with its overall purpose of ensuring that individuals and businesses are ade-
quately protected.
90. Responsibility for computer security should not be delegated to persons who are
evaluated on the basis of computer system performance. Such delegation is analogous to
assigning bank tellers to audit the daily cash flow.
91. See Agranoff, Achieving Security Awareness: Tips & Techniques, COMPtrrER SE-
cURrrY J., Spring 1983, at 7.
92. See R. FiSHER, supra note 4, at 8-9, 20-21.
93. See id. at 152-53 ("Application Development" questions).
94. See McAfee, The Virus Cure, Datamation, Feb. 15, 1989, at 29. A computer virus
is essentially the corruption of application programs or O/S routines, often by a perfectly
legitimate user. Software to prevent, detect, and recover from computer viruses has begun to
be developed. Anti-viral devices are in their infancy at this writing, but will surely come into
their own in the near future.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
96. Again, the terminology is not standardized, and authorities list anywhere from
three to six major functions of access control software. The categories and models repre-
sented herein are generally consistent with the writings of any recognized authority.
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an ID-Code97, be established for each system user on the ACS file.
When a user attempts to access the system, the ACS file is checked
for the ID-code. If the ID-code is not present, access is denied. 98
Fig. 3
ACS FILE: INDENTIFICATION
Surprisingly, ID-Codes are non-secret. The ID-Code is typi-
cally printed in numerous documents and reports that traverse the
organization. Unique identification is necessary for ACS file rules
to be meaningful and unambiguous. 99
2. Authentication
Identification is merely a claim of identity. Anyone can sit at a
terminal and type an ID-code, especially when these codes are non-
secret. Authentication is the means of validating the person enter-
ing the ID-code.
The most common authentication device is the password. Sup-
pose that a password is recorded for each user on the ACS file. Af-
ter the user enters the ID-Code and is verified, the user must then
enter his password. If the password is not matched to the password
in the ACS file, access is denied. 1"
97. Also variously known as a Logon-ID, Account Number, or User-ID.
98. See Figure 3. This illustrates three users (ID-Codes) on the ACS File, identified as
USER-I, USER-2, and USER-3. Certain miscellaneous data is normally associated with each
ID-Code, such as: Name, Department, Unit, Title, phone number, etc. If a person entered
"USER-4" as an ID-Code at the terminal, that person would be denied access to the system.
99. See also R. FISHER, supra note 4, at 25.
100. See Figure 4. A password is associated with each ID-Code. The user will not be
allowed to enter the system unless the password he enters at the terminal matches the pass-
word on the ACS file. In this case, USER-1 must enter password "LAWYER," or be denied
access to the system.
ID-CODE MISC-DATA
USER-1 - - - -
USER-2 -- - -
USER-3 - -- -
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Fig. 4
ACS FILE: AUTHENTICATION
Passwords as an authentication device have two major weak-
nesses. First, it is fairly easy to crack most passwords mathemati-
cally. 10 1 Second, the tendency of persons to choose easily-
remembered (and thus easily-guessed) passwords, or even to write
these passwords down in an obvious place, is part of security folk-
lore.10 2 Thus, security personnel have long been seeking stronger
authentication methods. 103
Generally, there are three authentication methods for a user:
something he knows (i.e., password); something he has (i.e., mag-
netic card); something he is (i.e., finger length, retinal pattern, sig-
nature characteristics). If one of the latter two methods is used, the
authenticating data would be digitized and placed in a password
field on the ACS file. The user's possessed item or personal charac-
teristic would be compared to this field." ° Non-password authenti-
cation has not received general acceptance, largely due to cost and
reliability factors."0 5
101. See L. HOFFMAN, supra note 4, at 9-11 for technical details. For example, a 3-
position password, alpha/numeric, has (36)3 or 46,656 possible combinations; not an insur-
mountable number for attack by computer.
102. A favorite anecdote among security professionals is that of the expert who, given
someone's personnel file, could guess his or her password within 10 tries in 90% of the cases.
The author's personal experience supports this story, at least for systems which have no re-
strictions on the passwords a user may choose.
103. Password secrecy is sometimes enforced by encrypting the password on the file.
Even if the full ACS File is not encrypted, as normally it is not, the password field in each
user record should be.
104. See R. FISHER, supra note 4, at 26.
105. In the author's opinion, non-password authentication is surely comming. Note that
there are variations on simple passwords, such as requiring the user to answer a series of pre-
determined questions (mother's maiden name, etc.) This has never caught on as it is too
ID-CODE MISC-DATA PASSWORD
USER-i -- - - LAWYER
USER-2 -- -- CLIENT




Assuming that a user has accessed the system via ID and pass-
word (or other authentication device), it does not follow that the
user should be able to access10 6 every file available to the system.10 7
Authorization states what resources a valid user may access and in
what manner he may access them. Any attempt to access unau-
thorized files will be denied.10 8
Fig. 5
ACS FILE: AUTHORIZATION (ELEMENTARY)
ID-CODE MISC-DATA PASSWORD FILES
USER-1 LAWYER FILE-A
USER-2 - - - - CLIENT FILE-B
FILE-AUSER-3 - - JUDGE FILE-B
Authorization may put conditions on system access. For ex-
ample, a given user might be able to access a given file, but only
from a certain terminal or terminals01 ; at certain times of the day
or on certain days of the week; or to read but not update. Further-
more, conditions may be combined, i.e., a user may read the Pay-
roll file from any terminal, but update only those persons with
salaries under $30,000.00, and only on weekdays from terminals lo-
cated in the home office.
In general, any system element that a user might access is, the-
oretically, a resource whose access can be restricted based on condi-
cumbersome for most installations to maintain and not difficult enough to stop a dedicated
intruder.
106. Recall the definition of access, see supra note 3.
107. It would be just as foolish to state that an employee who belongs in an office has an
automatic right to look through every file cabinet and desk drawer in that office.
108. See Figure 5 for an example. If USER-i, a valid user who signs on with the proper
password LAWYER, tries to access FILE-B, that access would be denied.
109. That is, User JONES might be restricted to signing on from Terminal 15, or be
allowed to sign on from any other than Terminals 20 or 29. This is different from saying that
he may access the Billing File provided he is on Terminal 15 only. The former is a "sign-on"
(ID/Authentication-type) restriction; the latter is a file resource (authorization) restriction.
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tions. 11° This may include restrictions on things like application
programs or programming languages.
Fig. 6
ACS FILE: AUTHORIZATION (INTERMEDIATE)
ID-CODE MISC-DATA PASSWORD FILES CONDITIONS











9 - S LOCAL TIME
ON WEEKDAYS.
In practice, authorization is conceptually more complex than it
would seem. At its advanced level, instead of directly stating re-
sources and conditions for each user, tables are established for each
resource stating who may access the resource and in what manner.
Further, instead of actually naming the users allowed by ID-code,
the table may list groups of users, and the individual in question
must be a member of the proper group. Conceptually, this has
the same effect as the authorization rules discussed, but the ad-
vanced methods permit the greater flexibility needed for large
organizations. I "
110. See Figure 6 for an example. If USER-4 signed on to the system with a valid ID-
Code and password, then tried to read FILE-V from a terminal located in a branch office,
access to FILE-V would be denied.
There are no specific limits on conditions that may be imposed on file access. The ones
mentioned in the text, however, illustrate types of restrictive conditions that one would ex-
pect to find in use today. See also L. HouumAN, supra note 4, at 23-27 (additional technical
explanation).
11. See Figure 7 for an example. Each user must be added with a GROUP CODE to
permit resource access decisions to be made. For example, User-A (Group Code G-l) could
access File-M, but for read only, not update. If User-A, a valid system user, tried to access
File-M for update, or tried to access File-X for any purpose, access would be denied.
This method seems quite a bit more tedious than the former ones. However, in a mod-
em large computer network, with thousands of resources and tens of thousands of users,
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ACS FILE: AUTHORIZATION (ADVANCED)
I. FI LES
FILES GROUPACCESS CONDITIONS
FILE-M G-1 READ ONLY
G-2 UPDATE IF
UNDER $50o000
FILE-X G-2 NO RESTRICTIONS
G-3 READ ON WEEK-
DAYS ONLY
It. USERS
In summary, authorization restricts the files a valid user may
bring up once he has legally accessed the system. It can be relatively
straightforward or quite sophisticated, stating very detailed access
conditions. Authorization is without doubt the most important ele-
ment of technical computer security.11 2
there is no practical alternative. If done correctly, this method has the same effect as that of
Figure 6. See also R. FISHER supra note 4, at 26-28.
112. For the sake of completeness, authorization must be distinguished from file pass-
words. Before modern access control software, it was common to specify that certain key
files, such as the Payroll File, could not be accessed unless the user supplied a "file pass-
word." This could be enforced by software, and administrators were responsible for dissemi-
nating the password to the proper persons (ideally changing it on occasion).
File passwords, of course, provide no basis for user accountability, as one cannot tell
who has actually accessed the file. Today they are best used as an additional security device
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4. Logging
Even assuming that the authentication and authorization func-
tions are working perfectly, there is nothing thus far to stop an in-
truder from signing on with a valid ID-code and trying every
possible password until he stumbles across the correct one. Should
that happen and the organization suffer a serious loss, management
would surely wish that it had kept a record of actions against the
ACS file so that it might be able to discern what happened, plug the
leaks, and possibly recover from the violation. This is exactly the
function of logging (also variously called journalling or recording).
Logging is the electronic recording of significant ACS file ac-
tivity. Such activity will normally include all access requests which
the security system denied such as invalid password attempts1 13, or
any valid requests which the system administrators somehow
deemed worthy of inclusion. The purposes of logging are to catch
actual malefactors, deter potential malefactors, and provide infor-
mation for system recovery.114
5. Monitoring and Surveillance
Logging normally results in the production of violation re-
ports, or hard-copy listings of potential security violations. Man-
agement should monitor these reports and take appropriate action
to identify and correct problems as early as possible.115
Such external actions, however, are not the exclusive method
of surveillance. Suppose that one specific ID-Code requests, say,
five file accesses in one terminal session, all of which are denied.
The ACS software might automatically "suspend" the ID, meaning
that it can no longer sign on to the system until a system adminis-
trator investigates and "unsuspends" the ID.116
In very advanced systems, a security console might be notified
for very sensitive files, just as PPD's are used as an additional security device for dial.up
users. See supra text accompanying notes 75-81.
113. Many good systems do not record invalid password attempts, since the huge major-
ity of those are simple keying errors. However, logging may record the fact that one ID-Code
had breached some threshold, such as ten password errors, in a single terminal session.
114. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 29. It is also common to use logging as an electronic
record of all changes to the ACS File itself. Id. at 36.
115. The author has actually seen access control systems, with identification, authentica-
tion, and authorization, that offered no system logging of any kind. Apparently the manage-
ment felt that logging was and monitoring were not worth the cost.
116. In terms of the model, Figure 4, assume that MISC-DATA contains an item called
SUSPEND. If it is "on," then the user cannot access the system, even if entering the correct
password. This method is administratively preferable to deleting the entire user record, then
having to re-enter all of it later.
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of attempted violations in progress, and a security administrator
could call an officer to the terminal.117 It is also possible to keep a
real-time "trace" on users or terminals suspected of illicit activity.
This is the electronic equivalent of a police "stake-out".
E. Selected Problems in Computer Security Implementation
There are several commercially-available software packages
which purport to implement the computer security controls dis-
cussed. The layman might assume that since the basic principles of
computer security have been well known to practitioners for over a
decade11 , all that is needed to solve the problem of unauthorized
access is to install one of these security packages and assign a staff
person to be in charge of it.
However, in order to appreciate the concept of due care with
regard to unauthorized access, it is necessary to have a deeper un-
derstanding of some of the day-to-day problems in computer secur-
ity. The following examples demonstrate that the mere
implementation of basic computer security controls may be insuffi-
cient to protect against information abuse; more "curbs on technol-
ogy" are needed.119
In an area as dynamic as this one, it is impractical to perform
an exhaustive survey of all computer security problem situations.
However, the lawyer who studies Part III should acquire at least a
working vocabulary of computer security and thus be able to deal
with the experts in the particular situation under consideration. 120
1. Proving Identity
As discussed previously, the usefulness of access control
software depends in part upon its ability to validate the identity of
the person attempting to access the system1 21 , and the device most
commonly used in validation is the password. 122
Suppose that an organization has implemented access control
117. See R. FISHER, supra note 4, at 29-30. Such "real time" surveillance represents the
state-of-the-art in logging functions. More commonly, a terminal will be "locked" after some
number of violations have emanated from it, and the user must initiate a call to the security
administrator to have it "unlocked."
118. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
119. Cf supra note 2.
120. Much knowledge in the area of computer security exists informally among practi-
tioners, sometimes printed in working papers or brought up at conferences, sometimes pub-
lished in specialized journals, sometimes just whispered. Unfortunately, no definitive text yet
exists.
121. See supra § III-D-1.
122. See supra § III-D-2.
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software, but an intruder nevertheless gains access to the computer
system by using another person's password. Can it be said that the
organization has done all that was reasonable to ensure protection
of its computerized data against unauthorized access and should
not be held liable for injury to an individual?
The plaintiff may argue that the defendant company failed to
follow any of several "known" password protection practices. Spe-
cifically, defendant should have: mailed the password to the actual
user in a "Personal and Confidential" envelope; required confirma-
tion of receipt of the password123 ; required the user to change his
password at least once every 90 days 124; not permitted the password
to contain vowels or duplicate characters 25; monitored the area to
ensure that passwords were not posted on walls, terminals, or
placed conspicuously in desk-top in-trays; conducted education pro-
grams to persuade users not to choose "trivial" passwords 126; not
allowed a changed password to be the same as one of the last three
123. These two situations apply when the user's initial password is centrally-selected, but
not of course when the user himself selects the password.
124. A common saying among practitioners is that "A password which is never changed
is but an extension of the (non-secret) ID."
125. It is well known among practitioners that limiting the use of vowels and requiring
some numbers in the password will lessen the chance of its being guessed. Of course, it may
also lessen the chance of its being remembered by the user and may thus cause him to write it
down. Regarding the precise formula, practitioners generally feel that there should be limits
on allowable passwords.
Some software security systems permit installations to enforce restrictions on password
selection if they so choose. Sometimes the attempt to enforce restrictions is relaxed to the
point of absurdity:
"UNIX [a popular operating system known for its user-friendliness] requires, at least in
one version, that a password should be a string of at least six characters, with the additional
requirement that [it] contain at least one numeric and one non-alphanumeric [i.e., special
character such as asterisk.] This is a reasonable requirement and UNIX imposes it, not once
but twice... But on the third attempt to introduce [a non-complying] password or, indeed,
any password, UNIX will accept it... (I]t is not difficult to imagine how many passwords, in
practice, comply with the rule of having at least six characters including two odd ones." I.S.
Herschberg, The Hackers' Comfort, Computers & Security, April 1987, at 133, 134,
Even if this particular loophole is closed, there is nothing to prevent future loopholes
from arising in the name of "user-friendliness."
126. In some 40% of the cases [surveyed], Mr. Baker's password was also
BAKER and similarly for Messrs. Smith, Jones, and so on. This in itself is no
news; it merely confirms what has been found on many, too many, previous
occasions.. .T]he user.. .is loath to exercise his imagination to the extent that
he not only serves his own comfort.. .but thereby greatly contributes to the
hacker's comfort.
Id.
The author's own experience as a data security administrator supports the belief that
users will frequently choose trivial passwords.
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passwords that the user had chosen127 ; logged password violations,
or if already logged, investigated repeated attempted violations; al-
lowed the user to change his password on demand if he suspected a
compromise; encrypted the passwords themselves on the access
control file 128; used password suppression on terminals 12 9; displayed
a "Last Sign-on Message" at the terminal13 ; periodically verified
that users still worked with the company and were thus entitled to
retain their ID and password. 3'
The defendant company will undoubtedly produce its own ex-
perts to testify that while each of the above is favored by some prac-
titioners and may have been discussed at security conferences and
work sessions, their use is an internal company matter subject to the
normal business decision-making process. These devices are hardly
"standards" by which liability to an individual may be judged.
This is all quite true. No standards currently exist to specify
precisely what "password authentication" means. However, imag-
ine a bank purchased a cheap vault with a shoddy lock capable of
being opened with toothpicks; the mere fact that the bank had a
vault may be insufficient to avoid liability. Yet, the mere fact that a
company has some method of computer security may shield it from
liability despite the ineffectiveness of the security system itself. Suf-
fice it to say that the fact that an organization has access control
software with passwords is no guarantee whatsoever that unauthor-
ized persons cannot access the system. 132
The industry has long been aware that password authentica-
127. Users have been known to rotate trivial passwords, i.e., select AAAA, change it to
BBBB, then back to AAAA, ad infinitum.
128. Normally certain technical programmers can read the access control file. Encrypt-
ing the password provides another measure of security for the password against these experts.
129. It is good practice, but not universal, for a password typed at a terminal to not be
displayed. This causes problems for poor typists but is the rule today in most installations.
130. When a user signs on to a terminal, this message tells him when he last signed on.
If he knows that he did not sign on at that time, then he can report a possible compromise to
system security administrators.
131. Surprisingly few organizations will tie the Personnel System into the Security Sys-
tem. A person may leave the company, give his ID and password to a friend, and the ID is
never deleted from the system. No one knows who "really owns" each active ID.
132. Even if all the above objections are met, consider this question: if a user signs on to
a terminal with a valid ID and password, and subsequently, before signing off, there is a
period of inactivity at the terminal, should the system automatically log the user off the termi-
nal? The problem, of course, is that the user might have been called away on what he
thought was a brief distraction and ended up away from the terminal permanently, forgetting
that he was signed on. Should there be so-called "Idle Time" restrictions, whereby the user
must re-enter his password or be denied access? If so, how many minutes of idleness qualify,
and should that be a mandatory standard?
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tion is inadequate. 13 3 However, alternatives require extremely ex-
pensive pieces of specialized equipment which are not cost effective
for individual organizations. Thus, the development of alternative
authentication devices is left to vendors and their perception of
market demand. To date, however, vendors are not persuaded that
it is worth their while to develop alternatives. 134 Thus, as long as
there are no standards for imposing liability for computer abuse,
businesses will not spend money to achieve a higher level of secur-
ity, and there will be no incentive to vendors to develop more so-
phisticated computer security tools.
In addition to the inability of current authentication methods
to prevent unauthorized access, these methods also offer little help
in fighting computer crime.' 35 Suppose that a legitimate employee
embezzles funds by attacking computer files. Police trace his iden-
tity through the system logs which show activity based on his ID-
code as authenticated by his password. The prosecutor may think
that he has an identification method as strong as a fingerprint, but
any defense attorney should be able to prove the inadequacy of a
password as the basis for a felony conviction.
In summary, access control software might serve to protect
computerized data against unauthorized access if the identity of the
person attempting to access the system can be proven. However, the
current level of computer authentication offers no guarantee that
such identity can be ascertained with any reasonable degree of cer-
tainty. If there are no standards for authentication to which busi-
ness must adhere, then victims may go uncompensated and
criminals unpunished.
133. "Current [user authentication] technology allows for voice, signature and other
forms of identity verification. Based on widespread use and the absence of a generally accept-
able alternative, the password facility is expected to continue. A cost effective alternative to
passwords should be developed." W. Zopfi, J. Ludwig, E. Dominy, A. Hasegawa, Future
Directions for an Information Security Architecture (July 13, 1986) (unpublished manu-
script) at 7 [hereinafter cited as Directions]. Directions was presented at GUIDE 65, an IBM
users' group, meeting in Chicago, July 13-18, 1986. Its purpose was to discuss security re-
quirements in IBM products, with a view towards pressuring IBM as well as other vendors
into offering meaningful security controls. Id. at Foreward.
134. "We believe signature authentication to be the most secure technology available
today but we have not succeeded in finding sufficient applications to justify the development
of a product." L. Wills, Security Strategy Response (March 18, 1987) (unpublished manu-
script) at 8 [hereinafter cited as Response]. Response was presented at GUIDE 67, meeting in
Anaheim, Cal., March 16-20, 1987. Its purpose was to serve as IBM's answer to Directions,
supra note 133. Response at 2.
135. Cf supra note 35.
[Vol. 5
CURB ON TECHNOLOGY
2. Restricting File Access
Suppose that an organization has implemented access control
software and a valid user injures another individual by accessing
restricted data13 , using his own ID-code and password. Can it be
said that the organization did all that it reasonably could to prevent
unauthorized access to restricted files? Should that organization be
held liable for injury sustained as a result? This question is consid-
ered in detail by examining three situations.
a. Sensitive Residue
When a user at a terminal requests a file, the data appears to be
transferred directly from storage to the terminal screen. When the
user finishes, the data appears to return to storage. Theoretically,
the data is protected, since a user should be able to retrieve from
auxiliary storage only those fies permitted to him.
However, this is not actually the case. When an authorized
user requests a computer file, the data is not directly transferred to
the terminal screen. Rather, the data first goes to the computer's
main memory.' 37 The data stays in main memory, even if the user
writes the file back into storage, unless specific action is taken to
clear it.138 While it is theoretically possible for the computer system
to clear the data in memory automatically, this is cumbersome for a
number of technical reasons; and, in practice, it is nearly always
necessary for the user to clear the data.' 39 The risk is that if data is
not cleared from memory, it can be read subsequently without un-
dertaking unlawful access.
Some books and articles on computer security mention this
problem; some do not. Is it standard knowledge among practition-
ers? Would management be negligent for failing to insist that users
clear memory and for failing to audit such compliance? It is argua-
ble. The average person certainly knows that classified data cannot
be simply discarded in a public trash receptacle. But, the average
layperson is unaware that destroying a computer printout does not
protect the data stored in the computer memory.
Clearing memory can be difficult, and deleting a computer file
136. Cf. supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 45-51.
138. The user thinks he is "moving" the data from one medium to another. What he is
actually doing is "copying" the data. This is what makes theft of data different from theft of
tangible items. If one "steals" a mailing list file, the organization from which it was stolen
still has the original data file.
139. See HoFFMAN, supra note 4, at 93-34.
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does not necessarily mean that the data is obliterated. 140 There are
two reasons for this. First, unbeknownst to the terminal user, the
computer system may be making a backup of the terminal input for
perfectly legitimate reasons.14 1  Therefore, even though the user
has "deleted" the data, it is simply saved elsewhere. Second, a "de-
letion" might not physically remove the data, but only mark it as
"unusable" for the present and physically remove it only upon "re-
organization" of the disk. On the one hand, this improves the effi-
ciency of the computer system, but, it also creates a risk of
unauthorized access and abuse. Would management be negligent if
data which has been "deleted" nevertheless managed to appear and
cause harm to an individual? 42
Therefore, even if one has authentication methods which guar-
antee that no one can assume another's identity, and even if one has
authorization methods which guarantee that only authorized users
can read a given file, there is still no guarantee that the data on the
file can be restricted to authorized users. The problem, once again,
is that there are no standards to specify precisely what "authoriza-
tion" means.
b. Bypass Mechanisms
Even if the problem of sensitive residue were solved, current
authentication methods are still inadequate to guarantee the protec-
tion of data. The previous discussion of authorization'43 implied
that authorization tables, if accurately established and not circum-
vented by user impersonation, would prohibit unauthorized users
from accessing fies in auxiliary storage. However, all systems per-
mit "bypass" mechanisms.
A bypass mechanism simply instructs the operating system to
override anything specified in the authorization tables. A security
140. See P. Elmer-DeWitt, Can A System Keep A Secret?, Time, April 6, 1987, at 68.
141. A backup will be appreciated if the system "crashes" and all your input would
otherwise be lost and have to be tediously recreated. Crashes are not uncommon, and taking
backups has been standard in the computer industry for decades.
The taking of backups turns out to be fortunate for another reason, as a major protective
device against the current popular evil, computer viruses. See, eg., C. Winter, Viruses
Threatening Era of Computer Freedom, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 21, 1988, § 7, at 1,8. It is
undoubtedly true that good computer practice will remain useful in combating problems un-
known at this writing.
142. The Time article quotes internationally-known computer lawyer Susan Nycum as
stating, "This [situation] has worried me for years." P. Elmer-DeWitt, id. The irony is that
if "this situation" has been known for years, why is it not common knowledge among the
unfortunate public that uses computers?
143. See supra § III-D-3.
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audit may indicate that the tables themselves are correct, but it will
not show that they have been overridden in particular cases.
The rationale for bypass mechanisms is a technical one and is
grounded, ironically, in the desire for security. All computer manu-
facturers realize that certain system functions must be restricted
against the general run of users. 144 However, on occasion, a general
user has a perfectly legitimate need to use a restricted function. To
solve this problem, bypass mechanisms are created, whereby ordi-
nary users can be permitted to use restricted functions.
Permission generally comes in the form of special system codes
installed by a technical programmer and given to the user.145 Yet, a
large organization seldom controls its technical programmers and
special codes adequately. Thus, it may not be overly difficult for an
interloper to gain access to bypass codes. These codes might allow
the user to access any system file, and ensure that the authorization
tables were simply ignored in the particular user's file access
decisions. 146
144. Three common examples of functions prohibited to general users are: the ability to
rename files in auxiliary storage (which could wreak havoc for the user who could no longer
find his file); the ability to change operating system code supplied by the manufacturer
(known as "zapping," this could decommission the entire system); the ability to update the
system activity log (which could destroy any integrity in the monitoring and surveillance
process).
145. For example, the user may be given a code to enter over the terminal. Or, his ID
may be recorded on a special operating system ifie of privileged ID's.
146. See R. Paans and I.S. Herschberg, How to Control MVS User SuperVisor Calls,
Computers & Security, March 1986, at 46. Here is a highly-condensed summary of this
superb article for those interested:
(1) Many systems have a fair degree of security, as delivered by the manufacturer to the
user. But this security can be damaged by local modifications. The ability to modify cannot
be prevented due to current market realities.
(2) IBM, the world's largest computer manufacturer, markets the Multiple Virtual Stor-
age (MVS) operating system. MVS is among the most secure operating systems for commer-
cial applications in the world. It is used in the great majority of large commercial computer
installations. Yet, it is vulnerable to bypass.
(3) There are two classes of computer programs running on MVS: authorized and unau-
thorized. Roughly speaking, unauthorized programs are equivalent to application programs
(see supra note 51 and accompanying text), and authorized programs are equivalent to O/S
common routines (see supra note 52 and accompanying text).
(4) Only authorized programs can execute restricted system functions, such as input/
output operations (e.g., the ability to read from and write to files on auxiliary storage), com-
press disk space (for productivity reasons), and change O/S internal routines (which can
include authorization table codes), etc.
(5) However, nearly all unauthorized (application) programs require the use of re-
stricted functions. For example, an application program may legitimately wish to read a fie
on a disk pack, but input/output operations are restricted functions. To get around this,
MVS provides the SuperVisor Call (SVC) mechanism, which permits unauthorized programs
to execute restricted functions in a totally secure manner. The application program issues a
coded instruction which causes an SVC to be executed. MVS provides over 100 "standard
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It is difficult to develop cost-effective means to totally prevent
bypass exposure. Although there are a variety of administrative
mechanisms which could bring the exposure under control147, they
are labor-intensive and tedious, and are often considered by man-
agement to interfere with the "productive work" of an
installation. 148
No one would think much of a bank alarm system which could
be deactivated by the flick of a switch inside an unlocked desk.
Similarly, the value of an automated computer security system must
SVC's" which permit applicatiion programs to function while ensuring security in the use of
restricted system functions.
(6) The installation is also permitted to write its own SVC's which, when invoked, allow
a program to execute restricted functions. These are known as "User SVC's." The problem
is that User SVC's, unlike standard SVC's, are not guaranteed to be totally secure. If used
improperly, they can cause all security mechanisms to be bypassed.
(7) User SVC's have many legitimate uses from a performance/convenience point of
view. They are installed by system programmers whose primary responsibility is perform-
ance, not security. User SVC's have been found which permit unauthorized programs to
defeat any type of access control. The article details several horrors, all of which are quite
technical, although very easy for a systems programmer to understand. The point is that
manufacturers supply mechanisms which enable qualified persons, in the name of efficiency,
to defeat all known security mechanisms.
(8) Hackers can, with talent, patience, and a little luck, find the memory address of User
SVC routines. They can then use these routines in their own programs to disable security and
crack the system.
(9) In summary, an access control system is only as good as the operating system in
which it functions. If the operating system allows uncontrolled User SVC's, as MVS does,
then it can be secured only if it employs sophisticated, costly, labor-intensive administrative/
audit checking mechanisms. Most managers would be surprised to find how vulnerable their
computer systems are. In operating systems less secure than MVS, the picture may be even
worse.
147. See, eg., IBM, OS/VS2 System Programming Library: Supervisor, at 23-27 (1985).
In the case of User SVC's some recommended controls include: ensure that User SVC's, are
implemented only in accordance with strict guidelines developed and supervised by technical,
security and audit staff, ensure that User SVC's are tested by persons other than the develop-
ing programmer; ensure that User SVC's cannot be accessed by "unauthorized" programs
(see supra note 144, #3); since authorized programs reside in authorized libraries (groups of
programs), determine what these libraries are and who controls their usage.
The problem is that there is no general test to ensure that security is not compromised by
User SVC's or other bypass mechanisms. There are so-called "MVS Audits," which purport
to check the integrity of MVS security. Such audits, if properly performed, are very expen-
sive and tedious. The enforcement of their recommendations is usually left to the very tech-
nical staff against whom they were directed. Of course, no standards require MVS audits to
be performed by competent and disinterested parties in the first place.
148. The author recalls one particularly horrifying experience in which he thought he
was administering security in a medium-size computer system, while at the same time the
manufacturer's local representative (not IBM) was instructing clerical users in an easy
method to bypass the security system! The representative had made one promise to the au-
thor and another to the line manager. The author discovered this, quite by accident, thanks
to the keen ear of his senior subordinate. She was friendly with a clerk who inadvertently let
the matter slip out, not unlike the discovery of the existence of the Oval Office tapes.
CURB ON TECHNOLOGY
be measured, at least in part, by the ease with which it can be over-
come. Standards are required to define the acceptable limits of by-
pass mechanisms and controls thereon, and to be reasonably certain
that access control software is adequate to protect data against any-
one other than computer novices.
c. Lack of Uniform Security Architecture
If the problems of sensitive residue and bypass mechanisms
were solved, one might suppose that access control software would
effectively prevent unauthorized users from accessing another's
data. That might be true if, as previously implied, the access con-
trol software actually covered the entire computer system.
But such is not the case. What appears as "the computer sys-
tem" is, in reality, a group of several different hardware and
software sub-systems. The problem is that access control software
is neither hardware-independent nor software-independent. This
means that access control software which runs under one version of
hardware and software will not necessarily run if that hardware or
software is altered. Thus, adding a technical enhancement to the
computer system to increase productivity may destroy existing se-
curity mechanisms or render them far more difficult to use
effectively. 149
Again, the reason for this anomalous situation is the concern
for security. Many software subsystems were developed before any
general software security existed. Therefore, enlightened software
engineers developed their own subsystem controls. When general
access control software security packages came into their own, the
existing subsystem controls were not merged in due to cost factors.
Instead, a mixture of uncoordinated, incompatible, incomplete, and
redundant controls coexisting in the same computer systems
149. As technology has advanced to meet [business] demands of automation,]
emphasis has been placed on performance and productivity. Although many
data processing controls are administrative and precedural, rather than auto-
mated, there has been a lack of emphasis on automated controls being inte-
grated with new technology. The scope and quality of the automated controls
that have been incorporated have not been independent of the environment in
which they are used (i.e., hardware, software, or configuration).
Directions, supra note 133, at 3 (emphasis added).
In former days, a version of COBOL might run on one machine but not on another. Cf
infra text accompanying notes 191-92. In industry jargon, COBOL was not hardware-in-
dependent. Today it is, but access control software is today neither hardware-independent
nor software-independent. Thus, a change of hardware or software in the computer system
can and often does render the security system inoperable.
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emerged 150 , and no one was willing to overhaul the whole system to
ensure coordinated controls.
The obvious technical solution is a "uniform security architec-
ture"151. Security would no longer be an "add-on" to the operating
system15 2, but an integral part of the operating system itself.
15 3
However, it makes no sense for one manufacturer to spend itself
into bankruptcy attempting to construct the perfectly coordinated
system, while others continue to successfully compete with uncoor-
dinated add-on packages.
Since there are no computer security standards for new prod-
ucts, it is impossible to fault manufacturers for responding to per-
ceived market demands.54 Therefore, corporate officers and
directors may proudly point to sophisticated access control software
which "ensures" security and privacy, while ignoring the fact that
hardware and software additions can easily destroy what vestige of
security had been present.
Access control software, as it exists today, offers very little
guarantee of computer security. Protection against retrieving an-
other's files can be bypassed in a virtually uncontrolled manner.
Even if files are secured, the data thereon is not and may be re-
trieved from the main memory. Finally, since there is no uniform
security architecture, the existing security mechanisms themselves
may be rendered meaningless by add-on hardware and software.
These facts are well known in the industry and among practitioners,
but because they pose formidable technical and financial problems,
they are largely ignored.
3. Ensuring Individual Privacy in Statistical Data
Banks
The public often perceives security in numbers, feeling more
150. See Directions, supra note 133, at 3-4; Response, supra note 134, at 3-6. As one
example, attaching personal computers to a large computer system may subvert the controls
on the large system. Directions, supra note 133, at 4; Response, supra note 134, at 6.
151. "[A] uniform security architecture must be provided such that all [hardware and
software] sub-systems are able to be suppported by the architecture and security system."
Directions, supra note 133, at 3.
152. "[The term 'security package' is something of a public disgrace for the industry. In
any proper industry, it should not exist. Security, if industry is to deliver a satisfactory prod-
uct, should be part and parcel of an operating system... there should be no such thing as a
security package.. .option with all its attendant fees and complications. It should be an
integral part of normal operations. . ." Herschberg, supra note 125, at 137.
153. In other words, computer security would be a "common routine" that could not be
subverted by individual users. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
154. Cf supra note 134.
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protected by statistics than personal information. For example,
suppose a husband publicly accuses another of wife-swapping. Be-
cause a jury could easily identify the person accused, it would have
no difficulty finding the husband guilty of defamation. However,
suppose the husband publicly accuses ten unidentified men in a
group of one hundred. Since the public would have difficulty per-
ceiving which ten of the one hundred were guilty of the alleged im-
propriety, a jury would probably find no liability.
Consider the comments of Theodore Hesburgh, former presi-
dent of the University of Notre Dame and former Chairman of the
Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. In discuss-
ing the virtues of a national ID card as a method for keeping illegal
aliens from employment in the U.S., Hesburgh briefly mentions the
national data bank that would be necessary to support the card.' 5"
To allay fears of the data bank's security, he advises that "[u]se of
numbering systems rather than names in central data banks would
shield the individual's privacy behind anonymity.... " 6
Although it makes sense that one is harder to identify in a
group, this same assumption cannot be made with regard to com-
puterized data banks. It is not necessary to know personal identify-
ing information to deduce a person's identity mathematically from
surrounding facts."57 Consider Hoffman's standard example. Ask
the hypothetical national statistical data bank how many persons:
were born in Omaha, in 1913, are members of Phi Delta Phi, have
lived in Alexandria, Virginia, graduated from the University of
Michigan, and are Episcopalians. If the answer comes back "1",
then you have isolated President Gerald Ford, using easily obtaina-
ble public data and having committed no crime. If you now ask
how many persons, in addition to the above qualities, have been
convicted of a crime, the answer will come back "0" or "1", re-
vealing whether or not Gerald Ford has been convicted of a crime.
155. Hesburgh, National ID System Would Fight Fraud, Hartford Courant, Dec. 14,
1986, at E5.
156. Id.
157. Even if the [data base] system.. .doesn't even contain any identifying infor-
mation... it is possible to obtain a personal dossier on that person from such a
data bank. The potential for such use is often not obvious to users, especially
nontechnical users, of computers. They assume incorrectly that deletion of
names or other identifying information will guarantee the privacy of people
whose records appear in such data banks. This is not necessarily true.
L. HOFFMAN, supra note 4, at i24.
Note also that privacy can be invaded by less imposing data banks. For example, mar-
keting firms and banks that possess census tapes with block (neighborhood) data have the
potential to discern personal information.
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This information is obtainable despite the fact that the hypothetical
national statistical data bank does not contain personal identifying
information on Mr. Ford (i.e., no name, no social security number,
no address, etc.). 5 This same information can be obtained if the
system returns even large counts of the number of persons who
qualify.
159
Suppose that an individual's privacy were invaded by dissemi-
nation of information garnered from a statistical data bank. Could
the individual claim that the data base manager had been negligent
if there were no personal identifying data in the data bank? Some
may not even recognize the existence of that question. Others may
maintain that the data base manager, by supplying no personal
data, is not responsible for any damage.
There are several possible solutions to this problem. One
method is to "inoculate" the statistical data bank with random er-
rors. If done carefully on certain types of fies, the inoculation
would preserve statistical validity and protect individual anonym-
ity."6 Another method is to report inexact counts of persons. For
example, a range of persons (e.g., 20-30 persons with these
characteristrics) could be reported, or an indication made that "a
small number" (e.g., less than ten persons with these characteris-
tics) was found. This method, however, is not foolproof1 61; none-
theless, it will add a degree of protection for individuals. Another
method, valid more for psychological than practical reasons, is to
let users know that all requests for information from the statistical
data bank will be logged. 62
Again, the underlying problem in protecting personal informa-
tion in statistical data banks is that there are no standards specify-
ing what administrative and technical measures must be taken to
ensure individual privacy. Yet measures to ensure a reasonable
level of security have been known for years.
4. Miscellaneous Issues
There are several additional areas in which the installation of a
158. See L. HOFFMAN, supra note 4, at 124-125.
159. See id. at 125-129, for mathematical details. The algebra involved is basically no
deeper than the solution of simultaneous equations, and is rather simple for computers to
perform.
160. See id. at 129-130. Inoculation will preserve the general statistical utility of the data
bank, while rendering individual data less vulnerable to disclosure by mathematical attack.
161. See id. at 127.
162. See id. at 129.
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computer security package alone offers no guarantee of protection.
These are listed below, with minimal detail.
a. Electronic Mail
Businesses are increasingly using electronic mail systems to im-
prove productivity and efficiency. Rather than waste time on the
telephone or at the copy machine, a user can send a personalized
message over the terminal to another individual or copies of memos
to several terminals simultaneously. 16 3
When an individual receives a message through the mail, the
terminal normally will show the name of the sender, based on the
ID-Code and password the sender entered to sign on to the system
in the first place. Of course, knowledge of the identity of the sender
is only as good as the security of the password. Typically, elec-
tronic mail passwords are far less secure than passwords in access
control software systems. 164
The result is a problem for offices which wish to rely on "auto-
mated signature authentication" (i.e., the sender's ID as shown on
the terminal) rather than the customary physical signature. A good
authentication technology, therefore, would not only help in prov-
ing identity for access control software, but would also have a bene-
ficial effect on office automation and productivity.
b. Violation Reporting
It is generally accepted that security systems should not merely
prevent unauthorized access, but should assist system administra-
tors in tracking down potential violators.1 65 Yet, many systems re-
port violations in "batch" mode (i.e., hard-copy reports given the
next working day to an administrator) rather than "real-time" (i.e.,
notice given at a security console when the violation is occurring).
Furthermore, many systems cannot disable an ID during an at-
tempted violation (i.e., three password errors in a row), or disable a
terminal where violations are occurring. It is as if a bank teller
pressed a burglary alarm during an attempted but unsuccessful rob-
163. Any receiving user can get a hard-copy at his unit's printer is he really needs it. It is
surprising how seldom that turns out to be necessary.
164. One of the most popular electronic mail systems in use today offers only a 3-posi-
tion password, with no restriction on its values, and no mechanism to enforce mandatory
password changing. This is understandable: the idea of large system security is generally
acknowledged if not always practiced; but electronic mail system security has not achieved
that degree of user sensitivity as of this writing, probably because it offers less opportunities
to outside "hackers" than does a large system.
165. See supra § III-D-4, 5.
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bery on Friday, but because of infrequent monitoring, the police did
not get the signal until Monday morning. This situation makes it
far less likely that an intruder will be caught, and far more likely
that he will continue to try to gain unauthorized access until he
succeeds in disrupting the system.
Also, the violation reports that are produced are often cumber-
some or unusable for system administrators. They may feature too
much detail, or not enough, and generally lack the required flexibil-
ity to produce specific details on demand. The reason is that report-
ing mechanisms are driven by convenience to system designers who
have added security after-the-fact 166, rather than by convenience to
security personnel who are responsible for ensuring protection of
sensitive individual and company data.'67 If a hacker whose activi-
ties were detected but who has nonetheless remained undisturbed
eventually causes harm, can it be said that the organization was not
negligent simply because it had some semblance of a violation re-
porting mechanism in place?
c. Administrative Methods
Administrative security controls are often regarded as secon-
dary to technical security controls. They neither prevent nor report
unauthorized access, but simply support the systems which do. Ad-
ministrative controls are not generally manufactured and marketed
nationally but are created internally within the organization. Fi-
nally, they are typically implemented by persons paid less than
those who implement technical controls. It is not surprising that
even persons who favor technical computer security standards sel-
dom feel compelled to speak in favor of administrative computer
security standards.
166. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
167. See Directions, supra note 133, at 9-10, for an indication of violation report needs
generally un-met today. These include: flexibility in report selection criteria; more helpful
data in tracking down violators; deletion of overly-friendly messages that could help system
abusers.
Lack of standardization will cause a problem when attempting to document precisely
what happened during an attempted security violation. Discussing the efficacy of computer
crime laws in prosecuting offenders, Gerard Marsh, a computer security vendor executive,
notes that "The catch is that [for prosecution], the perpetrator's actions have to be docu-
mented, placing the burden of proof on data owners. Thus, it is advisable.. .[to] have ade-
quate software security products installed which can generate accurate and complete audit
trials... The problem here is that all [products] operate differently." Marsh, Computer Crime
Law Makes Software Safeguard Vital, INFORMATION WEEK, Feb. 2, 1987, at 40 (emphasis
added).
The general vendor answer to these needs is that the cost is greater than what the market
will bear. Resp-oinse, supra note 144, at 10.
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Yet, administrative standards are important. An individual
might be assured by the company holding his data that it performs
"security education and awareness" programs for its employees to
ensure the proper level of attention to security concerns. An indi-
vidual should have some understanding of what "security education
and awareness" means in order to meaningfully evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the program. However, there is very little published on
this subject, and individuals seeking to develop standards and evalu-
ate effectiveness will have to fend for themselves. 68
Similarly, an individual might be assured that the company
holding his data has a "contingency plan", to assure that informa-
tion can be recovered reasonably quickly and completely in the
event of a data center disaster. The individual should have some
understanding of what this means, and an assurance that the plan is
tested and maintained. Again, there are no standards by which
timely and accurate recovery are generally measured. 169
168. See, e-g., B. WILKINS, THE INTERNAL AUDITOR'S INFORMATIO SECURITY HAND-
BOOK 44-46 (1979); Agranoff, supra note 91. Briefly, desirable practices include, but are not
limited to: existence of a separate computer security unit; publication and regular mainte-
nance of a security policies and procedures manual; regular security presentations to staff;
routings to selected managers; placement of appropriate items in house organs; design of
forms which double as security procedures for busy operating management; orientation ses-
sions for new employees; separate company phone listings for Security; establishment of a
team to quickly respond to computer crime situation; and, occasional lectures by guest
speakers.
169. The author personally knows of an agreement a few years ago among three local
companies to make their data center available in case one company had a disaster. The
agreement was abandoned when one company suggested it be tested. So many modifications
in each company's systems had been made over the years that no company's software could
run on the other's hardware and version of the operating systems.
More recently, it is reported that nearly half the insurance companies responding to a
survey stated that they had no written disaster recovery plans, and 40% of those that have
such plans have never tested them. COOPERS & LYBRAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, COM-
PUTER SECURITY IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY (1987). For more information, the reader is
referred to the local Coopers & Lybrand office. For a detailed discussion of computer disas-
ter recovery see Burk, Failure to Prepare: Who's Liable in a Data Processing Disaster, 5 S. C.
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.I. 19 (1989).
It is further reported that no more than 50% of banks are prepared adequately to deal
with disaters. Baker, A New Verdict on Disaster Recovery, COMPUTERS IN BANKING, Nov.
1987, at 69, 76.
Banking senior management and their boards of directors have been put on
notice that they are responsible to assure the existence of adequate plans to
minimize risk to their institutions. This should foster the support of senior
management that is often the lacking element at financial institutions. If the
printed words do not, then the comments of examiners [backed by FHLBB
Memorandum R67 , issued Sept., 1986] should cause action.
Id. at 81.
The testing of contingency plans, and follow-up thereto, is among the most tedious activ-
ities that a large organization may engage in. The temptation to "skimp" on necessities is too
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Administration is a broad topic 170 which cannot be completely
discussed here. The point to emphasize is that the existence of "ad-
ministrative controls" means virtually nothing. There are no stan-
dards for evaluating the effectiveness of a given administrative
control relative to the technical control that it supports. However,
the implementation of meaningful technical standards should also
pave the way for the eventual establishment of meaningful adminis-
trative standards.
IV. PROTECTION OF SOCIETY: THE NEED FOR MEANINGFUL
FEDERAL COMPUTER SECURITY STANDARDS
The previous sections have examined computer system funda-
mentals, computer security fundamentals, and implementation
problems. Liability to persons injured as a result of unauthorized
access to computerized data depends, in part, upon the accepted
standards of protection for that data. The problem is to translate
computer security principles into meaningful standards which will
permit compensation to computer abuse victims and help to reduce
the incidence of computer crime.
A. Differing Views on Developing Standards
Much has been written on the need for standards in the com-
puter field. However, few offer suggestions as to how these stan-
dards are to be developed. One attorney believes standards should
be developed on a case-by-case basis, allowing a jury to decide the
correct standards to be used in a particular fact situation. However,
with the enormous variations in computer applications and security
practices today, a jury is likely to be confused and may even want
written standards to ensure individual justice. In response to a
query from the author, the attorney responded that the area is "too
new" to allow for meaningful standards.
Fortunately, many lawyers are aware that individuals and soci-
ety in general are victimized by the lack of standards of due care for
the protection of computerized data and that standards are unlikely
to develop on their own. Several recent law review articles have
recognized that establishing tort liability for information processors
might be necessary to protect the public. In reviewing various
obvious for comment. It is the author's personal opinion that adequacy of a company's con-
tingency plan should not be assumed unless certified by competent, qualified, disinterested
outsiders.
170. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
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threats to personal privacy that are exacerbated bycomputers 71,
one article states, "[tihe processor would be liable for any breach of
due care, which would... be judged against standards of an ordina-
rily prudent person within the industry and under similar circum-
stances." 172 But how does an "ordinarily prudent person within the
industry" act? The article did not provide specifics, but only noted
that because of the inadequacies of current security measures, busi-
nesses might be "forced" into executing protective measures.173
Another article considered the harm that could be caused by
persons using electronic bulletin boards. 174 For example, malefac-
tors can use electronic bulletin boards (EBBs) to steal proprietary
software, circulate stolen credit card numbers, and even operate il-
legal businesses. 175 The article suggests that although the message
originator actually causes the harm, the EBB operator should be
liable if necessary "both to discourage misuse and to reduce the
damage resulting from it.' 76 However, liability should only be im-
posed if the bulletin board operators acted unreasonably by failing
to take certain precautions generally accepted within the indus-
try. 177 It is unlikely that a court would find a law review article's
standards dispositive. More likely, a court would note that no gen-
erally-accepted industry-wide standards of due care currently exist.
Although each of the above articles suggests standards for
evaluating computer negligence, each suggests that these standards
should be developed on a case-by-case basis, according to develop-
ing public acceptance of their use. However, victims of computer
abuse should not have to wait for the common law to develop in
each of the fifty states, particularly since computer technology is
developing across state lines at such a fast pace. Common law stan-
dards are likely to be obsolete before they are implemented.
Mandatory federal regulations are needed.
171. Solomon, Personal Privacy and the "1984" Syndrome, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 753
(1985).
172. Id. at 789.
173. "Technological security must be purchased and so far there has been no profit mo-
tive in the industry to provide security systems. As the computer is used more in privacy
sensitive areas, the industry should be forced to realize that it is making a potentially danger-
ous product and, like the automobile manufacturer, the industry should be expected to take
responsibility for providing the necessary safety features." Id. at 786.
174. Note, Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability for User Misuse, 54 FORDHAM L.
REv. 439 (1985).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 445.
177. Id. at 452.
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B. Response of the Organized Bar
The American Bar Association has promulgated a report in
response to the need to combat computer crime. 78 Although the
report recognizes the inadequacies of current security measures, it
fails to consider the underlying technical issues.
In preparation of the report, the Criminal Justice Section of the
ABA appointed a task force to investigate various approaches orga-
nizations took to combat the problem. 7 9 The task force sent a ten-
page questionnaire 80 to executives of large corporations, major fed-
eral agencies, all state attorneys general, and some district attor-
neys.1 81  The task force stated in its cover letter that response
should take no more than 15 to 20 minutes. 82 However, the ques-
tionnaire contained several hundred individual items, many of
which were argumentative and ambiguous, or required considerable
investigation. Thus, a 15-20 minute time period is unlikely to have
elicited responses necessary to formulate public standards.
Despite the report's shortcomings, it correctly concludes that
federal computer crime legislation is needed 183, and advises lawyers
that until legislation is passed, better computer security measures
are needed to deter computer crime.
Regardless of these recommendations 184, though, the task
force has done nothing to implement action. The task force has
even refused to indicate if it will ever take any action. In short,
despite its enormous prestige, the task force has done nothing to
help lower the technological gap.
Perhaps one of the reasons the task force has failed to act is its
lack of technical qualifications to deal with the problem. Although
few attorneys are truly qualified to develop standards to combat
computer crime, the interests of persons who have been injured by
computer abuse are ill-served by lawyers who have no understand-
ing of the underlying technology or of the need for standards.
178. See A.B.A. Report, supra note 37. TheA.B.A. Report was cited by Congress as "one
of the first extenive studies done on the number of 'known and verifiable losses' which have
resulted from computer crimes .... H. R. REP. No. 153(1), infra note 211, at 9. It has been
cited in trade journals too numerous to mention.
179. Kuh & Nathan, Preface to A.B.A. Report, supra note 37, at iii [hereinafter Preface].
180. A.B.A. Report, supra note 37, at 1-2 to 1-12.
181. Preface, supra note 179, at xi.
182. A.B.A. Report, supra note 37, at 1-1.
183. Id. at 45-51.
184. Preface, supra note 179, at xv.
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C. Corporate Management Response
Much material published on computer security castigates cor-
porate management for not doing more to implement computer se-
curity. Yet the simple fact remains that computer security is not
currently considered economically feasible. 185  Top management
emphatically is not equipped to ferret out individual rights deemed
worthy of protection and establish mechanisms to effectuate them.
Rather, lawyers and legislators should take the lead in urging that
standards be created.
In this regard, corporate management is trapped by conflicting
pressures, desiring both high security and low cost. Both cannot be
provided.186 Thus, although managers may give lip service to se-
curity, they are unable to economically afford it. However, if
mandatory federal security standards were established, middle man-
agers could justify cost to upper management without sacrificing
competitiveness. As a result, business would be forced to invest in
computer security without losing their competitive advantage to
other computerized companies since each would be adjudicated by
the same standards. The businesses would benefit in remaining




The case for mandatory federal computer security standards
was first articulated by Dr. Willis H. Ware. 87 Dr. Ware, a com-
puter security pioneer, reviewed the need for computer security in
government and private industry, noting that several federal stan-
185. No responsible management is going to spend large amounts of money with no
tangible payoff in sight, and without legal compulsion to do so, the protests of staff analysts
notwithstanding. As one authority crisply stated, "Senior management interest rarely lasts
long when dealing with non-profit-center functions." Johnston, The People in the Black Hats,
INFOSYSTEMS, Sept. 1987, at 35. To look at the situation concretely: Would management
spend millions of dollars on fire-resistant buildings if it didn't have to, and if in so doing it
would price its company out of the market?
186. P. KEEN, COMPETING IN TIME: USING TELECOMMUNICATIONS FOR COMPETI-
TIVE ADVANTAGE 129 (1986). Dr. Keen has taught at Harvard, MIT, Stanford, and
Wharton.
187. Ware, supra note 33, at 71. Dr. Ware's brilliant article was the inspiration for this
present paper. Dr. Ware participated in the first serious consideration of computer security
in 1967, and among other things, spent two years with the Privacy Protection Study
Commission.
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dards related to computer security already existed. 18 8 He asked,
"[w]hy not, under the auspices of [the National Bureau of Stan-
dards], bring together the best resources within (and from outside)
government to handle the remaining details of security safe-
guards?.. .Why not have [standards which] specify the performance
requirements of a secure operating system plus the administrative,
procedural, and physical elements in which it has to be embed-
ded?"' 89 Many computer security professionals would favor stan-
dardized controls if they saw no other way to achieve the necessary
standards of control.190
The question is not so much whether government action is
needed, but whether there is an alternative. In the early 1960's,
recognizing that a standardized business programming language
would be highly desirable, the federal government pressured private
industry to develop COBOL. This became a United States standard
in 1968 191, and today is used extensively by private industry with
no ill effects. Without government action, financial considerations
would have prevented the standardized development of COBOL,
just as these considerations prevent the development of standard-
ized computer security controls today. 192
Attorney Daniel Burk, a distinguished attorney who drafted
the computer crime statutes for Virginia and the District of Colum-
bia' 93 , recognizes the "strong interdependence among technical,
legal, and managerial approaches" in the fight against computer
crime' 94, and encourages legislation which implements "the concur-
rent use of technical and managerial solutions."'' 9 While he stops
short of stating that these solutions would also assist in securing
compensation for victims of computer abuse, that is clearly the next
step. Technical standards are necessary to solve computer abuse,
and "technical solutions" should not be left to the whims of corpo-
188. Id. at 76. These include the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and certain Federal
Information Processing Standards (FIPS), which are largely administrative.
189. Id. at 76.
190. Legally, the bottom line for failure to secure a network which results in data
destruction or corruption, may well be negligence .... Stockbrokers, cutomers,
and other interested parties may see themselves as the victims .... When the
legal world meets the computer world the latter can discover that it has not
covered bases well enough to satisfy the former.
DATAPRO RESEARCH CORP., DATAPRO REPORTS ON INFORMATION SECURITY IS35.200-
106 (1985).
191. SHELLY & CASHMAN, supra note 33, at 13.5.
192. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
193. COMPUTER SYsTEMs, supra note 16, at 171.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 174.
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rate and vendor management since past experience has shown that
voluntary action is unlikely.196
2. The Promise: The Computer Security Act of 1987
The Computer Security Act of 1987 (the "1987 Act"), which
became effective January 8, 1988 197, states that "improving the se-
curity and privacy of sensitive information 19 8 in Federal computer
systems 9 is in the public interest...., 2 o Its major purpose is:
to assign to the National Bureau of Standards [NBS] responsibil-
ity for developing standards and guidelines for Federal computer
systems, including responsibility for developing standards and
guidelines needed to assure the cost-effective security and privacy
of sensitive information in Federal computer systems .... 201
NBS is to submit these standards and guidelines to the Secretary of
Commerce who may promulgate them as compulsory and binding
under authority of the Federal Property and Administrative Serv-
ices Act.20 2
If the 1987 Act results in the development of meaningful com-
puter security standards for the Federal Government, then it is
likely that these standards would gravitate to the private sector.
The Federal Government is the world's largest computer user.20 3
Any significant computer security standards which vendors must
meet in selling to the Federal Government would require considera-
ble hardware and software subsystem changes.2°4 These changes
would likely find their way into the very subsystems which vendors
sell to private industry.2 °5
Therefore, the question is whether the 1987 Act will eventually
result in meaningful computer security standards, i.e., standards
which will eliminate or reduce the problems in computer security
196. "[Technical restraints may require the sanction of law both to act as an additional
deterrent and as a method of 'blessing' technical restraints in general." Id.
197. Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, 101 Stat. 1725 (1988).
198. "Sensitive information" is broadly defined to include any information whose misuse
"could adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of Federal programs. .. " Id. at
§ 3.
199. "Federal computer systems" are broadly defined to include virtually any computer
operated by or on behalf of a Federal agency, except for defense and military intelligence
systems. Id.
200. Id. at § 2.
201. Id.
202. Id. at § 4.
203. See SHELLY & CAsHMAN supra note 33.
204. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
205. d.
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previously noted.20 6 If so, then the dawn of computer security pro-
tection for individuals and businesses is on the horizon20 7; if not,
then the "charade of computer security" will continue.20
The 1987 Act specifically assigns NBS the responsibility for
developing computer security standards and guidelines in all areas
(technical, physical, administrative) 09, and authorizes NBS to con-
duct research to determine computer data exposures and devise
cost-effective controls.21 0 The accompanying House Report specifi-
cally recognizes that the Institute of Computer Science and Tech-
nology (ICST) within NBS already has a good track record in
standards development. 211 NBS is further assigned supporting re-
sponsibilities, such as development of security awareness and prac-
tice guidelines to be used by Federal agencies,2 12 and advisory
authority on computer system security and privacy plans which
Federal agencies will be required to establish. 13 In other words,
Congress appears to be taking the purpose of the 1987 Act
seriously.21
4
There is a danger sign, however. Immediately after acknowl-
edging that the 1987 Act would influence the private sector, the
House Report added that "NBS should consider the effect of its
standards on the ability of the U.S. computer system manufacturers
206. See generally supra § III-E.
207. "H.R. 145.. .standards and guidelines will strongly influence security measures im-
plemented in the private sector." H.R. REIP. No. 153(I), supra note 211, at 27.
208. Cf supra note 152.
209. 1987 Act, supra note 197, § 3.
210. Id.
211. H.R. REP. No. 153(), 100th Cong., 1st sess. 6 (1987).
212. Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, § 5, 101 Stat. 1725 (1988).
Federal agencies will be required to implement the programs in a timely manner prescribed
by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management. Id. at § 6.
213. Id.
214. [The Computer Security Act of 1987] would give the National Bureau of
Standards - not a military agency - the responsibility to assess the vulnera-
bility of government computer and information systems except for critical de-
fense and intelligence systems. [It] will put new emphasis on the need for
developing increased awareness of the importance of computer security and on
the potential losses or disruption of vital government programs that could re-
sult from unauthorized access to Federal computers.
Brooks, Computer Security: A View from Congress, DATAMATION, Sept. 15, 1987, at 124
Supp.
For an account of the modest struggle between NSA (military) and NBS (civilian) over
which agency would control computer security standards for unclassified data, see 133 CONG.
REC. H5341-44 (daily ed. June 22, 1987); H.R. REP. No. 153(1) 100th Cong., Ist sess. 7-22
(1987). Both sides, military and civilian, did in fact favor the establishment of federal
standards.
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to remain competitive in the international marketplace. 215
Although this statement may merely acknowledge the high cost of
re-tooling hardware and software sub-systems to effectuate mean-
ingful computer security, it may give manufacturers the ability to
"gut" the 1987 Act.216
3. The Prospects
Although the 1987 Act was signed by the President on January
8, 1988 217, no Board members21  were appointed until December
12, 1988.219 The Board held its first meeting March 1-2, 1989,220
and plans to hold its next meeting May 31-June 1, 1989.221 As of
May 8, 1989, the Minutes of the March meeting were not publicly
available.
The composition of the Board itself is somewhat disturbing.
Four members are appointed from the Federal Government, four
from the computer industry, and four from outside the Federal
Government not employed by the computer industry.222 It may be
assumed that the Federal Government representatives favor the es-
tablishment of meaningful computer security standards.223 It may
also be assumed that the computer industry representatives will be
attuned more to commercial market conditions that to the need for
215. H.R. REP. No. 153(1), 100th Cong., 1st. sess. at 27 (1987).
216. The Computer Security Act of 1987 envisions the creation of the Computer System
Security and Privacy Advisory Board (the "Board"). The Board consists of a Chairman and
12 members. Eight of the twelve members are from outside the federal government and
receive only travel expenses for their services. Four of those eight members may be employed
by manufacturers. In effect, Board members serve pro bono.
At least one of the four federal government members must be from NSA. The Board
reports its findings, not solely to NBS, but also to the Secretary of Commerce, OMB Director,
NSA Director, and certain congressional committees. The Computer Security Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-235, § 3, 101 Stat. 1725 (1988). There is no provision for computer lawyers
to be members of the Board.
According to one authority, The National Bureau of Standards plans to use the 1987 Act
to develop meaningful computer security standards that would reach the private sector. Tele-
phone interview with Dr. James Burrows, Director of The ICST (Nov. 19, 1987).
217. Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, 101 Stat. 1725 (1988).
218. See supra note 216.
219. U.S. Department of Commerce News, TN-5709, Dec. 12, 1988. Note that NBS
became NIST, the National Institute of Science and Technology.
220. Letter from S. Radack, an NBS adminstator, to M. Agranoff, March 28, 1989; Tes-
timony of Ray Kammer (hereinafter, Kammer), Deputy Director of NIST, March 21, 1989,
page 4.
221. Power, Board Needs More Time to Examine Security Issues, Government Computer
News, March 20, 1989, at 88.
222. Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, § 3, 101 Stat. 1725 (1988).
223. See supra note 214.
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compensation of victims of computer abuse.2 24 Thus, the balance of
power may be held by the non-Government, non-industry repre-
sentatives. It would seem logical for this group to be composed of
"computer security professionals" working in commercial applica-
tions today. Yet, that did not happen for two reasons: first, Board
members receive no compensation225 , making it unlikely that the
best-qualified active professionals would be able to serve; secondly,
it is unlikely that the best-qualified active professionals had even
heard of the Board, or that the Board would have known which
professionals to seek out.226 In short, the professionals most likely
to understand the shortcomings of today's computer security sys-
tems, the persons forced to deal with these systems on a day-to-day
basis and without a vested financial or political interest in the sys-
tems, have been excluded from the Board.
The Board, of course, is solely an advisory body.227 One might
suppose that its findings would be reported to the Director of NIST
(formerly NBS) who would then submit them to the Secretary of
Commerce.22 But in fact, members of the Board can circumvent
NIST by reporting directly to "the appropriate committees of the
Congress.' 22 9  Any representative group which feels that the
Board's recommendations are not in its interests can lobby its own
case directly in Congress.
It is further unclear if NIST considers the development of
meaningful technical computer security standards to be a high pri-
ority. NIST testimony following the March 1-2, 1989 Board meet-
ing refers to "the development of needed voluntary industry
standards."'230 Curiously, there is no explanation as to why
mandatory standards would not be sought. Stranger yet, an attach-
224. See supra text accompanying notes 133-34, and 191-92.
This comment is not intended to denigrate computer industry representatives, many of
whom the author is friendly and many of whom sincerely believe that computer security must
be improved. It simply recognizes the fact that manufacturers are in business to make a
profit and should not and will not venture into money-losing activities without compulsion to
do so.
225. See supra note 216.
226. Most computer security professionals are not lawyers, and their knowledge of the
law in this area is limited to what they read in COMPtJTERWORLD and other trade journals.
When the author asked Ms. Radack, supra note 220, whether he himself would be ap-
pointed to the Board, Ms. Radack replied, "It's doubtful. Have you applied?" In other
words, a non-lawyer computer security professional would have to know that NBS was seek-
ing applicants for the Board.
227. Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, § 3, 101 Stat. 1725 (1988).
228. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
229. Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, § 3, 101 Stat. 1725 (1988).
230. Kammer, supra note 220, at 3.
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ment to this testimony downplays the role of technical security in
the overall scheme of data protection.23' The testimony heavily em-
phasizes NIST review of current government agency security
plans232. It makes clear the fact that the "turf war" with NSA is
not over 233. Yet, it has almost nothing to say regarding private sec-
tor technical standards234.
Thus, the Computer Security Act of 1987, whatever it may ac-
complish for NSA and NIST, may not actually result in the estab-
lishment of meaningful computer security standards to reduce or
eliminate the problems described earlier.235 Nothing less than an
adequately-funded subcommittee, with public hearings, technical
and legal staff, and witnesses not bound to the computer hardware
and software industry, is likely to produce the standards necessary
to compensate victims of computer abuse and protect society from
computer crime. Yet no public outcry for such standards has been
heard, making their implementation unlikely in these days of
deregulation.
V. CONCLUSION
The future is being driven by. a technology so rapid that even
professionals in the field have difficulty keeping current. There is
virtually no chance that common law courts can protect individual
rights and compensate victims of computer abuse in the face of this
expanding technology. When individuals are powerless to respond,
and private enterprise cannot or will not respond, then Govern-
ment, guided by public-spirited lawyers, must step in with meaning-
ful, workable solutions. Mandatory federal standards, established
under authority of the Commerce Clause, are necessary to ensure
protection of individuals against computer abuse. Persons who do
not believe that the situation is serious enough to warrant the high
231. "Computer technology can itself be part of the solution to the problem of protecting
computers and the data they handle." Kammer, Attachment at 2,(emphasis added).
232. Id. at 5-8.
233. Id. at 34. See also supra note 214.
234. Dr. Willis Ware (see supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text), a member of the
Board, told the author in a telephone conversation on April 14, 1989, that he did not believe
that the 1987 Act would have any substantial impact on private sector computer security.
An NIST staff member, who requested anonymity, told the author in a telephone conversa-
tion on April 24, 1989, that NIST "hoped" that any standards set for federal computer sys-
tems would permeate to the private sector, but that this could not be assured. In light of
these comments, and action under the 1987 Act to date, it is apparent that the federal govern-
ment is not interested in a uniform security architecture necessary to ensure meaningful com-
puter security. Cf supra § III-E-2-c.
235. See supra § III-E..
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cost of standards236 might ask themselves: what will it be like by
the year 2000.237
236. For an account of what happens when Congressional action is delayed due to budg-
etary constraints, see H.R. REP. No. 100-1088, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988) (crisis in the
nation's financial institutions caused in part by failure to maintain adequate salaries and ex-
penses for federal regulators and law enforcement agencies).
237. This situation promises to get worse. The latest data processing buzzword, as of
May, 1989, is "integration." Integration means different things to different people, but gener-
ally is understood to refer to the uniting of information technologies, i.e., data base, applica-
tions, and networks (global and local), within one company. The major integration problem
is that multi-vendor (and ofter incompatible) hardware and software systems, which exist at
nearly all large companies, must be taken into account in the unification process. See, e.g.,
Computer Focus on Integration, A. Dooley, ed., April 3, 1989.
Is it reasonable to suppose that technicians and users responsible for integration have
made data security a priority item? In reference to what standards?
The bottom line is that integrated systems, more powerful, efficient, and user-friendly
than today's "standard" systems, are the wave of the future. If it is difficult to retrofit secur-
ity packages into standard systems (see supra § III-E-2-c), it will be several times more diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to retrofit security packages into multi-vendor integrated systems, if
meaningful security has not been part of integration planning from the start.
Individuals may have far more to fear from the development of future commercial com-
puter systems than they currently realize. There are no generally-accepted industry-wide
security standards for integrated systems, to which enterprises might be held to account. It is
as if a three-story building were expanded to twenty stories, and after expansion, someone
thought to ask if the foundation were adequate to support twenty stories.
It would be preferable, the author believes, if computer security standards could be set
by the private sector, just as generally-accepted accounting principles are set by the private
sector. But the economics of modem technology will not allow it. The federal government
must no longer hesitate to use its Commerce Clause powers to protect citizens.
